Introduction To Process Philosophy /\'T'?'l!h,ll'-l' TO dclilir-latc tllc nc\\. col~ccpt of' reality 11i~~st necessarily incliidc reference to thc philosophp of intcrclcpcnd- T I-' " cncc, also lcnon~n :IS 11c\\; pl~ilosophy, or organicisnt. 'The iden of .interdcpe:>ctc11cc1 c.ste11cts to all fields of philosophy. It stands in s17i1rp contrast to boll^ clcpc.nt1cnc.c :inti inctcpcntlcncc. J)cpc~~dcncc implies that somc tl~ings AJ:~ complctcly depcntlcl~t for their cxistcncc ancl 11i1turc. or1 otllvrs: thiit "ot.11c.1." may I,c Got), lll?ivc~sijI~, .itlcas, forsn ant1 n~atter, ilcscartcs' spirit ant1 matter. Indepcnclt.ncc has Iwcn traclitionall!/ attrit)ateil t:) Cot1 or to cntitic.~, usually spiritiial or psychic ill :latu~-c, ivl1ic.h cxist (usually cternidly) cluitc apart from dependent ~,orticul;irizatiorl. Theology spe;iks of (:sc.:~tor and crctitosc in tvr~ns of dependc~~cc. al~d co~ltingcncy. Gocl is Spirtt.z~s itldc- 1)w/~Liei~s; inan is ~C/ICII~~CI?~Y./~- rr IDeo. 1nt:c'rcic~pcncIence in\lol\~cs ulti- mate unity as Iwing as t.ruly clepenclcnt upon ultilnatc plurii!ity as p111rality is tlepvntlcl>r II~>OII 11lt i111atc ~lnity. Source of the new reality citn he tr;tcctl to priig~~~atism or iilstrtl- 111cn talis~n. .\ lctapl~ysio11Iy it fin(l s its roots in \\/hitchcad's philoso- phy of orgnnisnl. His idea of thc .tvol-ld as "self-creative. crcati\lit!;" is consonant \/ith Ilis vie\\; that "it is as true to say that Gocl crci~tcd thc n?orl(l as that 1-hct world crcatcs God."' \\:hitchcad bifurcated God jnto ;I j>ritnordial at~il consecl~lcnt natiirc., the formcr being a sort of up-to-date container of Pl;ltoJs ideas, w1hiIc tlic latter is tleno~llinatvcl the. occasion of occasions. ''Tlhc ~C\V tllought is ;llso dc- pentlent u11on I;mcrgcntisln. 1). \V. Gottslialk could write that rela- tions not only al\viiys otist in it.e~ils of fact, but .items of fact al~vays r 7 cxist in relatioil. In his A.lc.tap3zy.sic's 111 i\'lodcr~l f i~zes, l3~rblishcd 1950, he dcclarcs: "'l'hc: lwrlnancncc of expcriencc exists irl ant1 th1-oug11 chanw as the cllange of experience exists i11 and through 9 pcrmancncc. T'he em13jric;1l situation is neither pure emotion nor pure substance, but a relational con~plex of change nncl permanence irl ~vl~ich c;icli csists in tl~v other., each is inter-inc7rcciicnt, so to speak, i!) the other and each is as ultimate ;IS ~hc otherh"ll1lat is the rela- tion of th? philosopI~y of interdcpcndcnce to religion? Iicligion is concerned with thc goal of life, not with casual and teleological meta- physics. 'Tile goal of life is to enjoy intrinsic value. Religion lielps a person to discover and attain such \raluc. The philosopliv of process 01- organicisn~ can trace its roots to the 18th century, in Greclc and scholastic thought finite things arc bound together by a chain of causal relationships, never sufficient in the~nselves. The grouncl of contingent and secondary causes is an original uncausecl causc, necessary being, God. Empirical philosophy and biblicaI theology disco\lerecl the fundamental discontinuity be- tivcen tllc metaphysical cl~~est for God and the scriptural revelation of God. 112 so doing both rejected static concel~ts. Hartshorne ob- serves that many things come into reality, but not everything doe! so. Few have thought of God as doing this. God is real; he doe! not have to become real. The mere existence of God is not an instancc of becoming, but only of being. For process pllilosophy the realit! of God includes more than his mcre existence or being. Rather thf divine reality in its concreteness is the eminent form of becoming. Fichtc and Shelling both introduced dynamic categories inti philosophical thought. And in the ccntcr of all processism stand Hegcl, for whom thc universe in .its totality is a rational whole which final reality is absolute spirit or idea. For Hegel the univers is :i mity of thought ind\velt by Geist; reason holds the key to th process ant1 reason is activity and energy. "13eason is the infinit encrgy of tl~c universe; since reason is not so powerless as to h inc:lpablc of producing anything but ;I mcrc ideal, a mere intcntio --having its place oittside reality, nobotly knows whcrc; somctllin scparatc ant1 :il)stract in thc heads of certain hun~an being^."^ Absc li~tc spirit ~~ceds a world to f~~nction as rational energy. "God as a abstraction is not thc true God: only as the living process or positill his other, thc ivorld, and first in union with his other, as spirit, ca he be subject."The Universe is therefore dialetical process. Eac successvc stage prcscr\ies the truth of the previous one and nlovf on to more comprehensive expression of truth. The reality of tl world is fro111 God in thc dialctical movement of his being. "A comes fron~ God and all is in God; all is created by God and : remains as ;I moment in I~im. God is the movement to~vards tl ~vorlcl and its Aufhebung. "" Hegel launched idealist thought on movement from emphasis on being to becoming. Philosophy cou never return to a concern with an unchanging absolute. Heg marked the end of the old philosophical ideaIism. Hartshorne sa that if we reject beconling as the basic for111 of reality we can ho that being is basic with bccoinjng an inferior derivative; or that wh is .cvitI-lout becoming, is alone real. Thc options are thtrcforc clea either tlualism or eternalistic monism. Neo-idealists emphasized thc dynamic form of processis Reality is spirit in dynamic, active movement of thought. Keali they held, is "a creative, dynamic flux of events, the essence of ~vhi is thought." Left-wing Hegelianism, represented in I