CONCORD Critical Methodology and the Lutheran Svmbols' Treatment of J Accounts T he above title exact wording reproduces almost the of the editor's request for this article. It obviously precludes any attempt at an exhaustive treatment of all the issues involved. At the same time, the is- sues are so crucial and complicated that it is both difficult and dangerous to consider some in passing and without reference to the others. Perhaps there is no topic in all of exegesis and theology which requires knowledgeability, if not expertise, in as wide a range of subjects. ~oires~ondingl~, the relevant literature is simply vast. While I hope I have done my homework ade- quately, I make no pretense to being a spe- cialist in the area, nor have I even had access to all of the recent Missouri Synod publications on the subject. Some of my reflections on wider aspects of the topic are slated to appear eventually in my cur- rent series in The S#ringfielder.l We must begin by specifying what lexi- con we are using. What "critical method- ology" in the first place? "Critical" is, no doubt, the usual shorthand for what is commonly labelled "the historical-critical method." However common, though, I think it can scarcely be insisted too much that it is a misnomer, except perhaps as a catch-all term for the whole spectrum of 1 "The Outside Limits of Lutheran Con- fessionalism in Contemporary Biblical Interpre- tation,'' XXXV, 2 (September 1971) and sub- sequent issues. the Genesis Creation approaches and conclusions. On our topic, zs elsewhere, it approaches irresponsibility to generalize about "critical methodology." Even prescinding from theological con- siderations, the variations are many and often significant, as a glance at the inuo- ductions and commentaries will confirm. Far more significant differences are ex- posed, of course, when theoIogicaI contexts are also investigated. That is, the real prob- lems are not exegetical as such, but her- meneutical - of the wider context, of how we construe the exegetical details. (There is no better example than yom or "day" in Gen. 1.) Sometimes it is merely a case of externally the same conclusion having fundamentally different ultimate import because of its different context. Very often, however, certain conclusions, or at least deployments of certain conclusions, are simply excluded. Thus, with the proper qualifications, and if one feels the evidence is compelling, one might agree with the common critical assignment of Gen. 1 and 2-3 to different sources (commonly called P and J, respectively) and even (although this is always a separate issue) with their ccmmon datings, at least in their final form (commonly sixth and tenth centuries B.C., respectively). However, if one also confesses, as was taken for granted on all sides when the Lutheran Symbols were written, that they also had a common Author, God the Holy CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 529 Spirit, we have a totally different sort of "criticism" beyond the initial surface agree- ments. Literary analysis, however valid in itself, is powcrless to answer truth ques- tions or make any ultimate value judg- ments. Absolutely and a prior; excluded are the common critical tendencies to pit the sources against one another as not to- tally compatible, not to speak of the entire web of evolutionism, imrnanentalism, sub- jectivism, and/or naturalism which has al- ways tended to haunt "historical-critical" investigations from their earliest origins in the Enlightenment. "Critical," in confessional context, can only imply the use of all tools, ancient and modern, in order to understand the sacred text better, never to sit in any kind of subjective judgment upon it. The situation changes radically when what, up to a point, may be merely a neutral method becomes a competing metaphysics or theology. It is the intrusion of extra-Scriptural value- judgments or criteria of truthfulness which , commonly makes "higher criticism" ob- 4 jectionable, not coincidental agreement on matters of date and authorship as such (up to the point of contradiction in terms, of course). Similarly with the "historical" part of "historical-critical." Whd conception of "history"? One defined by the Scriptures or by modern positivism (or other phi- losophy)? That of the Reformation or of the Enlightenment? Is it the Bible and the Gospel which interpret history, or is it history (or one's conception of it) which interprets the Bible? Is the intense his- torical consciousness of modern times merely being used as much as possible in order to understand the external and hu- man rupect of the insuipturated revelation, or does "history" represent a judgment that there is no other aspect or dimension than a this-worldly one? Does it accept the supernaturalism and the pattern of par- ticular intervention by a personal God which pervades the entire Biblical text, or do modern, secular canons of history cause all that to be rejected as "literalistic," "fundamentalistic," and so forth, or, at most, as allegorical stimuli to modern man's religious self-understanding? If something is finally judged nonliteral, is it on the basis of brosd hermeneutical or philo- sophical presuppositions which virtually force that conclusion, or is it on the basis of hard objective evidence as to the ap- parent intent of that particular text? All of this, however, also assumes a cer- tain understanding of how we relate to the Symbols, or of what "confessionalism" means. Unfortunately, a common under- standing of that sort can no longer be assumed, if it ever could. Hence, we must attempt to specify what definition we are 2 In the main, I am disposed to sing rhc praises of especially two recent "evangelical" works which reflect modern historical conscious- ness in Biblical studies without buying into the theologically objectionable attitudes often asso- ciated with "the historical-critical method": G. E. Ladd, The New Tesjmzent and Criticism (Eerdmans, 1967) and R. K. Harrison, Intro- dwtion to the 0k-d Tertament (Eetdmans, 1969). Two recent studies have underscored the extent to which the virulent liberalism as- sociated with higher criticism at the time the LCMS was formed may have caused it to ovet- react somewhat: Leigh Jordahl, "The Theology of Franz Pieper," The Lutheran Quarterly, May 1971, pp. 118-137; and David Lon, "The Sense of Church History in Representative Mis- souri Synod Theology," CTM, October 1971, pp. 597-619. However, neither article is too clear about what alternatives or limits of cor- rection are called for, and especially the second article ventures into theological judgments with which I can by no means agree. 530 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS using for "confessional" as well as for "critical" (or at least which ones we are not using) before we can pr~ceed.~ Presumably, we can exclude a simply relativistic approach, although the common analogical one often appears not to differ much, viz., merely being faithful us they were faithful -to whatever we perceive "mission" or "ministry" to be. In practice, this all too often tends to be of the "let the world write the church's agenda" or the "no separation of sacred and secular" types, with each confessional tradition sanctifying the same current fads in its own traditional language - or ignoring the latter if none can be stretched to fit, as the church ap- pears to become mote and more the agent of the Enlightenment and its values rather than of the Reformation. Really, the ques- tion of "history" anent the Symbols is quite similar to that of its relation to the Scriptures: of course, time and circum- stance will always vary somewhat, but are both Bible and Confessions allowed to de- termine what the basic problems are as well as the answers? Regrettably, I think it also necessary to exclude another increasingly common re- definition of confessionalism which may be 3 High priority, it seems to me, should be given to the establishment of structures of dis- cussion, self-criticism, floating of trial balloons, etc., without the subversion of fi~blicu doctrim or abandonment of church discipline. The ques- tion is scarcely whether Missouri has always been right on every point, but whether or not its bcssic traditional understanding of "confes- sionalism" and its consequent discipline is cor- rect. Some change is, no doubt, inevitable (sometimes even in order to remain ultimately the same), but it is one thing if the church changes its mind in an orderly and disciplined way (as it plainly sometimes has), and another thing if we join the typical "ecumenical" babel (and let no one deny that cspecially in the last decade it has often really been BABEL!). styled "ecurrxnical." Of course, the Lu- theran Symbols are suffused with nothing if not a profound ecumenical concern, but the modern variety would seem to be of a fundamentally different type. It likes to speak of the "sufficiency of the confes- sions," but I think the record clearly dem- onstrates that actual efforts to make the Symbols fully normative are usually in in- verse proportion to the championing of that slogan, which in practice readily comes to mean "anything goes," although, of course, it's all "gospel" and "confession" - just ask them! Instead of taking doctrine seriously and insisting on essentially full agreement, the modern type tends to begin with a sort of neo-mystical "gospel," with all confessional traditions simply various "windows" or "witnesses" to some undefinable "encoun- ter'' with Christ." Religion is considered basically a matter of religious experience and all articulations of it or doctrines are viewed as secondary and derivative. All of them are allegedly vindicated only by their consequences in life, especially in facilitat- ing meaningful interpersonal relationships and "humanization." Likewise, "revela- tion" in past events is known solely through their power to illuminate present esperience; there is no uninterpreted reve- lation. The Bible tends to be viewed as only a human witness to the human ex- perience of revelation. Perhaps it is in- sisted that we still "honor" our "tradition," but it is bad form, if not worse, to question the validity of someone else's "response" to "revelation." "Confessionalism" then 4 A recent example in print of the unwritten ecumenical rule that virtually anything said or done must be "gospel" appears in The Chd~tian Century, May 10, 1972, p. 551, where in an artide critical of the Campus Crusade for Christ, CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 53 1 really beconles pluralistic and repudiates the "scandal of particularity"; it confesses no more than that this has been our ex- perience, that this is the way things look from where we stand. In that spirit, of course, our ecumenical zealots can easily assure us that our under- standing has now "progressed to the point where all of our differences make no dif- ference, that we should "give up to get a better grip" and where we are even sup- posed to glory in all of our differences as, allegedly, evidence of the fulness and tich- ness of the ''gospel'' in our midst. One would not even waste time asserting what a caricature of traditional confessionalism the campus-pastor authors ask: "What does it mean ecumenically when the Crusade's campus workers declare that the gospel is not preached from certain local pulpits?" Cf. also Robert C. Wiederaenders (Archivist of the ALC) in a re- view of a translation of one of Wilhelm Loehe's works in The L~ltheran Quarterly, May 1972, pp. 195-196, commenting on how things have come almost full circle in a century, so that now "the question of identity is among the most critical questions facing us." 6 E. Theodore Bachmann (quoting Fredrik Schioa) in "Missouri and its Relations to Other Lutherans," Concordia Historical Institrrte Qrrdr- aerly, May 1972, p. 166. Another article in the same issue which appears to me to represent a polemic against traditional Missourianisrn is Alan Graebner's, "Thinking About the Laity in The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod." Most such alleged championship of the laity forgets the massive resistance which the laity usually offer to ecumenical liberalism, documented in Dean Kelleys' Why Conservative Churches Are Growing (Harper, 1972); cf. also Wesley Fuersts' pertinent remarks on the anomaly in The btheran Quarterly, May 1972, pp. 1 16 to 123. In spite of the recent decline in the popu- larity of activism, one notes how most of the ecumenical agencies seem almost desperately to be striving to keep the pump primed, and on the campuses the decline has evidently often come almost literally over the dead bodies of many of the campus pastors. that is, were it not the almost self-evident axiom behind most current ecumenical en- deavor! Philosophically, some brand of existen- tialism (and/or its siblings, dialectical theology, phenomenology, personalism, and so forth) has proved to be an extremely congenial companion to the type of ecu- menical "confessionalism" just sketched. However, it may also be isolated as char- acterizing still another brand of confes- sionalism, and a still extremely popular one. As its name indicates, its main accent lies on the "existential," that is, on personal and contemporary relevance or on the ap- plication of an issue, upon the experience of the confrontation with God and the resultant change of heart. One does not have to think too hard to understand how essential some such accent is to any living, vital appropriation of the Gospel and the confessions. Existentialist or related philosophies may thus be a very useful servant in enunciating the indispensable existential dimension of the Christian faith, but the servant may also turn into a terrible master. All too easily the traditional vocabulary continues to be used, but the faith is rcally radically reinterpreted from within. It would not be the first time that has been the result of an alliance between philosophy and Christianity, and, indeed, in my judgment, the results, in the balance, have been far more baneful in the case of modern exis- tentialism than with the Aristotelianism or "scholasticism" which it scorns so much. 6 Nor is it simple cynicism, I submit, to ask just who, in the absence of any church disci- pline, the participants in the official "dialogues" speak for besides themselves, or why even bother, when with its left hand the churches are renouncing "propositional" religion. 5 32 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS No doubt, the latter easily runs the risk of an excessive intellectualization of the faith, of forgetting the ultimate discontinuity of reason and revelation. But one does not avoid one ditch by veering into the oppo- site one- in this case, often into a virtual irrationalism and antiintellectualism, where the subjectivities of the Uredebnis or Alz- mtz (~lert) tend to replace the objectivi- ties of doctrine (which is readily styled "legalistic"), of factual history, or of in- spired Biblical text. In the more radical but not entirely un- related Bulunannian or "new hermeneutic" uadition, any and all talk of God's action in objective events, in the language of space and time, or as due to any super- natural causation, is regarded as "myth," that is, as a false "objectification" of the transcendent. Hence, it allegedly must be demythologized or "uanslated back into its supposed original "intent," into the lan- guage of personal experience, specifically of the transformation of self-understanding by religious faith. Our sense that things are not the way they should be, but could be better, has simply been expressed tem- porally in "creation" and "resurrection." The "Gospel" is often said to have noth- - ing to do with facticiry, with observable occurrences in the external world apart from my involvement, but is merely my experience of God's presence in judgment and grace, thus opening up new possibili- ties for my life in "authentic existence." The Resurrection was no physical event but the return of faith (then and now); "creation" means to confess total depen- dence on God, and so forth? 7 One of the major conclusions of S. Preus' recent detailed study of Luther's hermeneutics (Prom Sbadow fo Promi.ml Harvard, 1969) is, The fzdes qua commonly swallows up the Fdes qzcm (which itself tends to be given a t!loroughly mystical definition); confessionalism is reduced to mere con- fessing (don't ask what very much! ); we are told that no discipline is possible but that of "Gospel" (whatever that might mean, and one gets the distinct impression that that is precisely what it is supposed to mean); there are supposed to be no hermeneutical principles but "Gospel." contrary to Ebeling et al., that the subjectivism of the "new hermeneutic" represents the pre- vailing medieval view which Luther Ouercame, not which he championed. Cf. my review in Interfiretation, January 1970, pp. 94-100. 5 For better or for worse, the slogan "Gospel reductionism" has recently attached itself to this position. See E. H. Schroeder's attempt to turn the epithet to advantage in CTM, April 1972, pp. 232-247, especially in response to John Warwick Montgomery, who appears to have coined the phrase. If one accepts Schroe- der's etymological definition of the phrase (cf. often with "radical"), "Gospel holism" might be more appropriate, viz., the insistence that doctrinal artides dare not be treated atomisti- cally, but are all aspects of "the doctrine of the Gospel." Unfortunately, however, the issue ap pears to be far more than semantic. The theme that "the formal principle of Lutheran theology is entirely Christological" may simply be an alternate way of stressing holism (and the ulti- mate artificiality of the "formal" and "matetial" distinction because the Spirit who inspires is always the Spirit of Christ), but, if it is not very carefully qualified, it also runs the grave risk of making sola scripturd quite superfluous and thus, indeed, of participating in the great "flight from objectivity" in most modern the- ology. If so, "Gospel spiritualism" or "vaporiza- tion" (into subjectivity) might be a more ac- curate charge - or even "Gospel expansionism" as all kinds of secular and political idem of "mission" and "ministry" invade the defenseless realm of subjective "religion." But, above all perhaps, we have to decide whether we're talk- ing about mere jides qua or also about doctrine; if soh scriptam is abandoned for mere sub jectivity in the latter case, one has a funda- mentally different way of "doing theology" - in fact, almost an infinity of them! CRITICAL MHTI3ODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 533 It will readily be ,understood how this type of confessionalism easily assimilates to the ecumenical type, because it has vir- tually put itself beyond all rational criti- cism by defining "Gospel" or "faith" as "openness and trust," or as "earnest search- ing." Hence, one is scarcely surprised to hear repeatedly a defiant "Who's going to impose his brand of confessionalism on me?" in this connection. In sum, we may say that this version of confessionalism fails on two counts: both its spiritualism and its dualism (dichotomy of the subjec- tive world of religion and the objective world of science) ? It is at this point that we can tune into our specific concern in this article, viz., the Symbols vs. criticism on creation. There can be little doubt that the Symbols' accent in discussing creation is primarily "existen- tial" (using modern jargon, of course). In a sense, that accent simply reproduces what 9 The frequent assertion of this school that it is really nonphilosophical (often in criticism of Aristotelian-based "scholasticism's" insistence upon reasonable agreement on doctrinal formir- &ions) must also be challenged. Its very anti- metaphysical bias has all sorts of metaphysical implications, especially in its frequent rejection of Biblical supernaturalism and its resultant divorce of the spiritual and the material. Lu- ther's "existential" rejection of philosophical in- trusions is thus toto caelo different from the subjectivistic reductionism of modem existen- tialist philosophy. Karl Heim's work cannot be totally over- looked. It probably has to be ultimately classi- fied as "existentialist," but it does not serve our purpose to examine it further here. His dualism is expressed in terms of different "spaces." See his Chn'stkm Faith and Natural Science (Harper, 1957) and The Tramformution of the Scim- tific World View (Harper, 1953). Neither are we discussing language analysis or "logical posi- tivism," which, at least as concerns us now, tends to have about the same import as the various existentialisrns. we already find in the Bible.lo Some of that similarity may be due to the essen- tially similar antitheses which both con- fronted. (Are they ever absent?) The im- plication seen by the confessors in the hamartology of both Flacius and the Ro- manists that would have eirher made God responsible for sin or denied the essential goodness of the creatiop was in some ways not fundamentally different from the meta- physical dualism of good and evil implicit in the mythological systems against which Israel warred throughout its existence. Similarly with the confessional accent that although God is present in all creation, creation dare not be given any ultimate valuation - the essence of "paganism," ilncient or modern. Thus, we find consid- erable accent on continzcing creation and/or 10 One argument in a circle frequently en- countered in Biblical criticism to bolster an existentialist redirctionism appeals to an evolu- tionistic reconstruction of the history of Israel's religion (a major example of a survival of classical Wellhausenianism in today's criticism) : allegedly Israel's "faith" was originally con- cerned only with its covenant relationship with God and first began to conceive of Him as the only universal God of $1 nature and history when it was forced into competition with other nations and their gods, either when king- ship ideology was grafted on to Israel's earlier traditions in the early monarchy, or in and after the Exile in order to explain that catastrophe. Creation is thus considered no pan of the "reve- lation" (encounter) itself, but merely an "in- ference" from historical experience. One may concede that major accent was put on creation in those two periods, but, a cogent case can also be made for its presence in Israel's religion from the outset, so that any "cvolution" is "ourward" (like a bud opening) rather than "upward." When the strictly evolutionistic ver- sion is used to date documents (as classically in the dating of P) and that, in turn, to support the evolutionary theory, one really has "argu- ment in a circle"! And when, further, a "late, therefore inferior" axiology is applied, "destruc- tive" almost seems an undersratement. 5 34 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS "providence"; in fact, creation and preser- vation are scarcely distinguished at all. Nevertheless, the Dem twelutus or the Gospel is not knowable from creation. Rather the reverse! A real understanding of the creation as a function of the Gospel is possible only in the light of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. If this will suffice as a summary of sum- maries of what the Symbols have to say on the subject of creation,ll how do we relate it to the issues which agitate us today? A good share of the problem arises precisely because many of those issues, philosophic as well as scientific, not only were not in dispute in Reformation times, but often were utterly unheard of until modern times.12 I have already given my judgment that it is illegitimate to extrapo- late from the existential quality of the con- 11 Obviously no attempt has been made here to give sgecihc citations from the Book of Con- cord. The indexes of the various editions should suClce for that. My summary should also be checked against the discussions in the various "theologies" of the Confessions. Attention should also be called to the recent CTCR state- ment, Creation in Biblical Psrspective, which admirably reproduces the "existential" accent of both Bible and Confessions. Also noteworthy here is Robert Preus, "Guiding Theological Principles," pp. 12-23, in P. Zimmerman (Ed.), Rock Strata and the BibEe Record (CPH, 1970). 1"t should be noted that in many respects even the founding of LCMS 125 years ago antedates them. Darwin's Origin of specie^ did not appear until 1859, with its major impact, of course, not coming until later. It was almost exactly a century ago (December 3, 1872, to be precise) that George Smith announced to the Society of Biblical Archaeology in London his phenomenal discovery of parallels to the bib- lical Flood story in the cuneiform tablets re- cently excavated at Nineveh (a popular account of which can be found in J. Pritchard, Archae- ology and the Old Testament [Princeton, 1958, pp. 160 &I). fessional statements to any full-fledged modern philosophical existentialism. What the Symbols do have to say on creation could largely be summarized in the Small Catechism's "God has made me and all creaturesL; "me" as object harmonizes eas- ily with the existentialists' "dialogical re- lationship," but hardly the "all creatures"! Likewise, it seems completely invalid to me to attempt to argue from the techni- cality of the Confessions' silence on the modern issues that nothing dare be insisted upon concerning them in contemporary confessional subscription. Such an ap- proach ultimarely has to be IabelIed "literal- istic" or the like, just as surely as any other which disregards changed historical cir- cumstances (although nothing is gained by such labeling, from whatever quarter). Of course, the major new issue is that of his- toricity or facticity. Suffice it to be said at the moment that, in my judgment, it is hermeneutically or theologically invalid to dismiss those issues on the basis of (a) the Symbols' silence on the issue, as already stressed; (b) any existentialist or other spiritualistic dualism of "kerygma" or theology from the world of nature and history, as though all that made no difference to the world of "faith; and (c) any "Gospel reductionism" (if you will) which argues that we may dis- regard the traditional (and, I am con- vinced, also confessional) hermeneutical rules of unlcs senms literalis, scviptwa script~~anz interpretahw, dogia f;d&, et~?~ 13 The situation here is quite comparable to that of de Scri@twa, where the Symbols ate even briefer and deal even more implicitly with the theoretical issues than in the case of creation. As I have argued elsewhere, I also consider it invalid, for roughly the same three reasons, to CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 535 As concerns the dualistic evasion, there certainly is some truth to the frequently heard assertion that "the Bible is no text- book of science," cr that "there cm be no contradiction between science and faith because they deal with different realms of truth." However, the assertion cannot be made too glibly if truth is really one and if men's confidence is ultimately to be held. It is one thing to stress that the "Gospel" is primarily concerned with the "heart," but it is something entirely different to act as though it makes little or no differ- ence if its "kerygma" is also true in the world of space and time, as though "God" made no real difference in events, but only in our way of looking at them. Others have pointed out the strange inconsistency of much "liberalism" in this respect: in correcting excessive body-soul dichotomiza- tion in anthropology, or developing justi- fications for "serving the whole man," its accents are certainly not dualistic! A cer- tain related, backhanded and secularized awareness that nature cannot merely be the neutral stage for the history of redemption is apparent in the current ecology kick. In Old Testament studies it manifests itself in the current concentration on wisdom tradi- tions, with their accent on nature more than history (and much current exegesis is disposed to discover all sorts of wisdom deny the verbal inspiration and inerrancy of the Bible as confessional teaching. But also similar to the creation issues, that is not to say that all traditional formulations or deployments of those doctrines need be reaffirmed, or that in the light of modern perspectives and evidence (if it really is that, and not another theology or philosophy) certain secondary adjustments cannot be made to the "prehistorical" (Sasse) formulations with- out in principle calling them into question (issues of date, authorship, sources, etc., if "destructive" value judgments are thoroughly exorcized). influences imbedded in also the creation narratives of Genesis). We will not even raise the question of how a Lutheran sac- ramentology can survive in such dualistic, spiritualistic con texts. Precisely because so many people have become convinced that science has indeed contradicted Genesis and thus ultimately all of Scripture and traditional Christianity, there can be little doubt that there has been no other single factor nearly so re- sponsible for the decline of the influence of the church and the corresponding spread of secularization ("born too late to be Christian"). The various dualistic retreats into subjectivity certainly have not stemmed the popular tide, as, theoretically, I think they are no solution to the ques- tion, but only an evasion of it - or a "cop- out." (The same may be true of the other- wise laudable counsel to "stop arguing and preach it.") Nor do many of the testi- monials by scientists that they see no con- tradiction between their work and their faith necessarily carry much weight. As Rachel King stresses repeatedly in her stimulating work,14 that faith is probably often little more than a sort of nature mys- ticism, and probably little is heard from the typical liberal Protestant pulpit to shake it. If mechanistic evolutionisln con- tinues to win converts among the intelli- gentia, it will probably be to no little ex- tent because C. P. Snow's "two culture" analysis was only too correct! l" 14 Cf. below. Perhaps especially her chapter 18 is relevant in this connection. 16 The Two Cultures and rhe Sch~ntific Reeo- ktiolz (Cambridge, 1961). Snow argues that the assumption of an objective-subjective di- chotomy between the sciences and the humani- ties runs so deep that each culture only hurls epithets at the other, scientists accusing others 536 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS Before we pursue this discussion further and attempt a few suggestions of our own, perhaps one more increasingly popular, but in our judgment, spurious type of confes- sionalism should be mentioned. We have in mind the various approaches of a "process" type.16 In Roman Catholic cir- cles, but also elsewhere, Teilhard de Char- din's version is especially influential Over against the various mind-matter dualisms, this type of approach does have in its favor a certain unitive tendency, which better accords with Biblical holism. Also its at- tempt to use the more dynamic, Einstein- ian view of the universe over against the existentialist tendency to perpetuate the 19th-century Newtonian assumption of a closed, static universe can be seen to accord with the Biblical accent on "continued crea- tion." .- - of wallowing in subjectivity and themselves fielding charges of a dehumanizing objectivism. If clergymen and theologians also abandon holistic approaches, the chasm really begins to appear unbridgeable. 16 Most of them are to some extent indebted to the philosophical pioneering of AIfred North Whitehead. Other major names to be men- tioned here will include Hartshorne, Cobb, Pit- tenger, Wieman, and Meland (whence this posi- tion has long been more or less associated with especially the University of Chicago Divinity School and many of its graduates). In Ameri- can Lutheranism its impact is clearly discernible in especially the LCA. Perhaps especially note- worthy for our purposes is: Ian G. Barbour, Zssrres in Scisnce md Religion (Prentice Hall, 1966). Written by a man who is trained in both physics and theology, it ultimately gives its nod in the process direction, but most of the work is an objective and extremely lucid and helpful summary and discussion OF the ques- tion and the various solutions proffered. Much "theology of hope" weighs in in ultimately the same direction; a useful recent discussion of various futuristic theologies, also in relation to our topic and from a mildly Lutheran view- point, is: Hans Schwarz, On the Way to the Prrtwa ( Augsburg, 1972). However, that is about as far as the Bible car1 be adduced in its favor, and, as a matter of fact, rarely does it make much of a pretense of being either "Biblical" or "confessional," except perhaps in the most ecumenically attenuated contexts. Its rad- ical immanentalism is not totally incom- patible with Biblical theism either, but when we note how limited its "god" is in its power to act ("persuasion and love rather than coercion and power"), even in its ability to overcome evil, it is plain that we are far removed from the God of Abra- ham, Isaac, and Jacob. Conversely, its op- timism about man's capabilities, its substi- tution of "openness to the future" for the ephaprax of God's intervention, or of an "Omega point" for an incarnate, crucified Christ, all make it distinctly sub-Christian, at best. I myself would gladly dismiss it as scarcely even worth serious refutation in any context where Biblical and confessional authority are taken with any seriousness, but wishful thinking does not change the fact that we are likely to hear increasingly more of it in the future, even in circles where those authorities are still accorded some nominal honor. What positive suggestions can then be made without either retreating into the inner self or trying to maintain the one- ness of all truth at the expense of the God- head itself? In the first place, I think it must be emphasized that if traditional, confessional hermeneutics is being upheld, any change in traditional exegesis will come only when compelling evidence seems to support the change, and all the more so if a departure from the literal sense seems to be involved. But what really constitutes evidence? Aye, there's the mb! Not entirely unlike a law COW, exegesis also always has to decide what is CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 537 and what is not valid, permissible evidence. The professional exegete soon learns to in- terpret (initially, at least) the assertion, "Professor X has shown convincingly" to mean no more than, "I agree with him." Elsewhere in Biblical interpretation, one is only too aware of the extent to which the exegete often creates his "evidence" - not in the sense of deliberate fraud, of course, but in the sense that his presuppositions to no little extent determine the shape of his answers in advance. (The Bultmannian and "new hermeneutic" traditions have made quite a point of the impossibility of "presuppositionlessness," but in order to exalt subjectivity, as though because of the difficulty in being entirely objective, one should abandon the ideal.) How does the layman in science assess the alleged "evidences" for evolution? (Or, on the other side of the fence, how does one discuss the mysteries of the Hebrew verb with one who knows no Hebrew?) At one end of the spectrum are the many, both scientists and theologians, who sim- ply, if not dogmatically, assume that evolu- tion is a long-established fact. If the theo- logians assume a dualistic position, it would seem to be a matter of utter indif- ference whether it is fact or not. In any event, nothing is so characteristic of the "liberal" as his facility in accommodating virtually any position, especially new ones. If my impressions are right, scientists on the whole (to the extent that it is possible to generalize) are no more impressed by the dualistic and monistic (process) at- tempts to salvage religion than they are by creationism. Chardin's well-known posi- tion, for example, is widely dismissed as "mystical" or the like and hence "unscien- tific." At the other end of the spectrum are - those scientists and theologians who argue that the evidence simply does not support the theory. Technically, of course, there can be no doubt that none of the "evi- dence" for evolution can be of the strictly "scientific" sort, for the simple reason that the experiment cannot be repeated. It is less than clear to the nonspecialist to what extent that invalidates many hypotheses. That we are dealing with hypotheses which, if accepted, have to be taken on "faith" al- most as much as traditional creationism is clear, as partly evidenced also by the pro- found changes Darwinian theory has itself undergone in its century of existence. Its highly theoretical nature, at best, is some- thing which it would seem even 'liberal" churchmen would have a certain interest in emphasizing - in contrast to their sometimes dogmatization of it every bit as much as some scientists. That rome evi- dence is involved, however, is seen in the extent to which even the most conservative generally concede that some "evolution" takes place within species.17 Likewise, I think an increasing disposition is discern- ible to concede that the "seven days" of Gen. 1 does refer to somewhat longel peri- ods of time than ordinary days - although 17 Sometimes "microevolution" is thus dis- tinguished from "macroevolution." Recent sup- port for this limited view, in contrast to the Darwinian assumption of evolution of all living things from a single cell, came from a noted scientist, Dr. John Moore of Michigan State, at a recent meeting of the Society for the Study of Evolution. Because of its provenance, it at- tracted some publicity. (Cf. The Lutheran, Jan. 19, 1972, p. 23, which, of course, did not fail to observe that most such attacks on the theory came from "religious fundamentalists.") Dr. Moore is quoted as saying that it is "rea- sonable to conjecture that there were multiple beginnings of life. Either there was ane creation or more than one." 538 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS usually not nearly so long as the immense periods generally~posited by evolutionists.'" There is no doubt that these viewpoints represent a distinct minority among scien- tists, but Christians who have any sense of Biblical "remnant" thinking should surely be among the last to reject and ridicule them for that reason alone. These scientists often complain about how other scientists dogmatically refuse even to give them a hearing; one doesn't have to look too hard to find enough comparable examples of "illiberal liberalism" elsewhere to make their complaint thoroughly credible.19 It 18 The literature representing this viewpoint is too extensive even to survey here. Some of it is probably well known to much of the CTM readership, at least by title. Easily one of the most thorough, and written by one with both scientific and theological training, is: J. W. Klotz, Genes, Genesis, and Evolution (Concor- dia, 1955; 19702). We have already men- tioned Rod Strata und the Bible Record, edited by Paul Zimmerman. Under the same editor- ship is: Creation, Evolution, and God's Word ( Concordia, 1972). Two brief, but excellent popular presentations from outside Lutheranism are: Wayne Friar and P. W. Davis, The Case for Creation (Moody, 1967) and Thomas Heinze, The Creation us. E~olution Handbook (Baker, 1970). 19 Cf., e.g., W. Rusch's documentation in P. Zimmerman (Ed.), Creation, Evolution and God's Word, pp. 42 fi. Repeatedly one hears re- ports of ecclesiastical establishment colleges and seminaries refusing even to considet hiring representatives of traditional or "fundamentalis- tic" positions, no matter how pluralistic their faculties may be otherwise, often to the extent of not even sharing a common confessional "heritage." Likewise, Ralph Moellering, Re- fledoms on the Cumpus Ministry (mimeo- graphed; private mailing, May 1972), p. 16, observes: "Oddly enough, 'liberalism' rarely seems to include toleration for more 'conserva- tive' viewpoints. A kind of bias in reverse automatically assumes that the more orthodox versions of Christianity are unworthy of con- sideration. An unacknowledged censorship bars conservative publications from many Christian never ceases to amaze how readily "liberals" can dismiss all the literature defending creationism with a facile sneer of "funda- mentalist" - almost the precise xeverse of the way some literature was once said to be looked at no further if first glance indi- cated it did not uphold verbal inspiration. Far and away the most massive attempt, - at least to the best of my knowledge, to come to rerms with mainline evolutionary theory (or at least a version of it) from a traditional or orthodox standpoint is Rachel King's The Creation of Death ad Lije." The work is a bit diffuse (ranging student centers and violates the esteemed open- mindedness of self-styled liberals." (The entire document is powerful documentation of the "theological vacillation and instability" in much recent campus ministry - but would describe many other ministries almost equally well.) 20 Philosophical Library, 1970. The jacket describes Dr. King as a "highly trained theo- logian with locg experience of the non-super- natural Liberalism which she has turned from as inadequate, and with long teaching expeti- ence in putting complex theological ideas into simple vivid langilage." A somewhat com- parable work by an LCMS clergyman, although of far lesser scope, is: Harold Roellig, The God Who Cures (Branch Press, 1971). In contrast to King, who attempts nothing less than a total synthesis of evolution and orthodoxy, Roellig's work is almost characterized by an (uawitting?) dichotomy - chronological, however, not ex- istentialist. The first third of the book appears to me to emphasize "random occurrence of natural phe.eno:neca" (p. 20) so much that God, although clearly posited, really seems quite otiose. With chapter five and the story of Abra- ham, however, Roellig abruptly shifts to an al- most totally traditionalistic position. On p. 107, he acidly observes that no field better illus- trates than New Testament literary criticism "that basic principle of scholar!^ research" that "the quantity of sound data is inversely COP related to the quantity of speculative theorizing" or that "the fewer the facts the more rampant the speculations." One can hardly help but ask if a dose of the same healthy skepticism might not have been salutary also in the first part of CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 539 over a good share of the total corpil~ doc- trime) and at certain individual points will surely have to be judged as simply idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, in the main it is such a welcome alternative to the usual massive either-or's as well as to the dualis- tic and monistic "solutions" that, however one ultimately evaluates it, it certainly de- serves far more attention than it appears to have received so far. Of course, it is con- siderably more recent than Chardin's at- tempt (a critique of which, as well as of other "competitors," King inciudes in her work), but the great disparity in the ac- claim the two works have received prob- ably speaks volumes concerning the biases of much of the theological e~tablishment.~~ the book. Pastorally, however, the work might be very helpfuI (I do not mean that deroga- torily). 21 One excerpt from King's work (p. 375) seems to deserve quotation: "Much more hope for the future of theology is to be placed in an important group of conservatives that would be roughly labeled as Fundamentalists by Full- Pledged Liberals, men who have either come out of the Thoroughgoing Fundamentalist Group or have moved toward Conservativism through disillusion with the bankruptcy of Lib- eralism. These men sympathize with what the Thoroughgoing Fundamentalists are trying to do . . . . But they do not subscribe wholeheart- edly to all the intellectual techniques Funda- mentalism has used to protect this orthodoxy, and they are aware of the cultural and scientific changes in the last hundred years and are awake to the need of some intellectual method of getting on in an intellectual working arrange- ment with the development of scientific knowl- edge. In this situation they are fortunate in having some corroboration from an increasing number of scientists who . . . are willing to go on record as believing in a God who is beyond the range of science and scientific inquiry, and some of whom are willing to go on record as believing that through the divine Christ man has remission of his sins. Possibly the greatest hope for renewed Christian belief in America at large comes from these intelligently conserva- The entire thrust of King's work is not easy to summarize without serious carica- ture, but perhaps it will have to suffice to say that the point of departure is the second law of thermodynamics or of en- tropy, which states that the universe is in- exorably exhausting its available energies and running down. This she relates to the origins and effects of evil, as the obverse of God's salvific designs. She goes beyond a mere appeal to the Heisenberg Uncer- tainty Principle, (applied to the indeter- minancy of also the atomic world as an explanation of how "providence" might work or an awareness that many scientific "laws" are only statistically true) ,22 to dear tive religious leaders and the spiritually oriented scientists." 22 In this respect, she clearly disassociates herself from the position of W. Pollard (The Cosmic Dram, 1955; and Physicis# and Chris- tian, 1961), another theologian-scientist, whose position appears to allow for no discrimination in God's activity, especially with respect to the origins and defeat of evil. Pollard's accent on entropy, however, is roughly comparable to King's. Of course, "indeterminanq" is capable of other interpretations, viz., atheistic, mechanistic and deterministic ones. The tragedy of the oft- times conservative refusal even to "dialogue," as well as of the dualistic evasions, is that one of the great "theological" debates of the 20th century (whether evolution is directed and teleo- logical or a matter of blind chance) is being car- ried on by scientists. By the default of the pro- fessional theologiaas the nontheistic scientists are carrying the day -and this is the real "theology" with which most of our college and university graduates are being imbued (also in many "church-related" institutions). Perhaps as good an example as any (not to mention B. P. Skinner in psychology!) would be the epilogue of G. G. Simpson's, The Meaning of Evoltltion (Yale, 1949), a widely used intro- duction to the subject. That that tide is by no means ebbing can perhaps best be documented in the recent bcst seller, Chance and Necessity (Knopf, 1971) by Jacques Monod, one of the 1965 Nobel Prize winners for his work in dis- 540 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS and repeated accent on deliberate interven- tion by a personal God who thus "nudges" the process in the desired direction and who would thus not even have difficulty working genuine miracles! This entire ac- cent on a personal God, plus no hesitation to affirm supernaturalism, thus preserves central Biblical accents which are com- monly missing in the virtual deism of "the- istic evolution." 23 One of the possible weaknesses of the work is that it merely appeals again to a "God of the gaps," only not quite such ma- jor ones as have since been closed by scien- tists to the embarrassment of earlier apolo- gists for Christianity. However, that whole argument can be turned on end, and a counterattack seems long overdue! Who covering the mechanism by which the genetic code is transmitted and protein synthesized within the cell. The philosophical conclusion : the process of life is totally blind. "Man tinally knows that he is done in the indifferent im- mensity of the universe. . . . No more thzn his destiny is his duty anywhere preordained. It is up to him to choose between the kingdom and the shadows." In the final chapter Monod stresses the need to develop a new basis for ethics based on "objective knowledge" since, he argues, the old prescientific basis has finally been proved nonexistent. The Unitarian re- viewer of the work in The Ch~i~tian Century (April 5, 1972) hails it as a work that "has completed, philosophically and religiously, the work that Darwin started, negating all remnant concepts of special creation." On the other hand, the reviewer in The New York Times (Oct. 15, 1971) is less than convinced ("one feels a desire to slaughter the messenger that brings this bad news"). 23 Cf. perhaps especially her trenchant re- marks in chapter 23 on many modern inter- pretations of the Exodus miracle, on the fashion- able refrains of "interpretation" of God's "mighty acts," of the prophets as "forthtellers," etc. Similarly chapter 28, as well as chapter 47 on heaven. On the Exodus, cf. Barbour, op. cit., p. 420. says that a "God hypothesis" is needed only in the "gaps" where no plausible sec- ular hypothesis can be constructed? Other- wise, the "God is dead" movement wouId indeed seem to be the only consistent out- come. Or put otherwise, it would mean that we should not rejoice that we have found God, but try to become better scien- tists. Space precludes further consideration of King's work, so let me continue with mis- cellaneous personal observations. My ini- tial, favorable reaction to at least many aspects of King's effort is because she af- firms ingredients that I think must be pres- ent in any synthesis that has any interest in retaining, in essence, the historic afKrma- tions of the Christian church. Perhaps we should underscore the matter of "evidence" again. We have already indicated how tricky a matter that can be, but, at any rate, such an approach is methodologically and hermeneutically (epistemologically) toto caelo different from those which do not proceed from the assumption of a ver- bally inspired text. The latter assumption, at least in principle, vetoes human subjec- tivity as a valid part of the investigation. Then we will not knowingly "deny" one iota of anything God has said, but neither will we pontificate prematurely on what "God says." It will never be a matter of the truth of the inspired text, but only of precisely what uuth God intended in His szcggestio rewm et verborzcm. Modern evi- dence (especially that provided by archae- ology) has brought many changes at many points in the historical understanding of the Biblical text. In principle, the situation should be no different with Gen. 1-3, al- though, obviously, the stakes are much higher, if you will, and one must make CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 541 haste very slowly in concert with one's en- tire confessional community. If the objective inspiration of the text must be reaffirmed, so must also "one lit- eral sense." The uniqueness of the latter rule for Biblical interpretation can be over- stated, because it really is an elementary assumption for all human communication, which would soon become babel if we could not take people at their word ac- cording to ordinary usage, except when there were clear signals to the contrary. However, that is also a way of underscoring the rule's importance for any serious, dis- ciplined Biblical exegesis, not the opposite. At the same time, those signals or the evi- dence may indicate that the literal, intended meaning of the text is nonliteral, or partly so. If one is not simply hurling opprobious epithets, this is the only meaningful dis- tinction between "literal" and "literalistic" -but, again, the danger of the intrusion of invalid (philosophical) "evidence" can scarcely be overstated. I defend the position that the "analogy of faith" (which, in this case, I under- stand as especially the basic historical, in- carnational nature of the Christian faith, with its corollary, the "personal" nature of the Biblical God) requires, at very least, basic historical, factual elements in the creation narratives. Any basic dualism of kerygma from fact is as unacceptable here as elsewhere in the history of salvation. Consistently the creation is presented as the first in the series of God's ''mighty acts." To interpret the material as only 'Iparable," "etiology," "myth (although the latter term has about as many mean- ings as writers, some of which might be acceptable) leaves us, in effect, with only moralistic allegory, the precise hermeneu- tical approach generally so strongly re- jected precisely because of its antihistorical procedure. This affirmation, however, need not mean that all aspects are equally historical in the same way. Even this may be very misleading, because the point is not some- thing less than historical in the sense of untruth (for God does not lie), but in the more-than-historical dimension of which the empirical is only a transparency. "Scrip- ture as its own interpreter" applies pri- marily to the theological yield, and any- thing which subverts or relativizes that is a prior; out of bounds. Some variation in the external or historical aspect or dimen- sion of that theological yield may be pos- sible, however, up to the outside limits of simple disjunction from facticity - which, in this case, "Scripture as its own inter- preter" would also proscribe. (Can there be any connection here with the oft-ob- served fact, that while the details of Gen. 1-3 are hardly mentioned again in the Old Testament, the basic historicity and theology of what is reported there is simply everywhere assumed?) However, even these distinctions anyone who takes the formal principle with utmost seriousness will venture only most cautiously in the light of what appears to be hard e~idence.~' 24 In these attempts to sort out the issues or to attempt to steer one's way between pre- scientific literalism and liberalism of whatever stripe, many Roman Catholic investigations, following the guidelines of the Pontifical Bib- lical Commission, once seemed very helpful. I will mention only one: John Dunne, How God Cveated (Notre Dame, 1960-still in print). That same author, however, illustrates poignantly how radically the situation has changed within the Roman communion in his more recent The Way of All the Earth (Mac- millan, 1972), calling forth the editorial in Chris~imity Today, April 14, 1972, p. 25, en- 542 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS Where does that leave us? Maybe I can only say here that as far as Gen. 1 itself goes, that is of the creation of universe and of matter, it seems to me that at least a modus vivendi of various cooperative working hypotheses is not unthinkable be- tween the traditionalistic and confessional, but also historically sensitive, exegete, on the one hand, and the scientist, on the other, who can concede that his most cher- ished hypotheses still leave much unan- swered and that perhaps some basic modi- fications in the direction of creationism will have to be seriously considered. (This may be a sort of via media between two extremes, but let it be clear that there is no metbodologicd assumption that one de- termines truth by compromising! ) In principle, at least, the compatibility of creationism and "natural law" would ap- pear to have been affirmed all along in the confession of personal creation. All theo- logical problems with evolution appear to be present already in embryology. (Cf. the debates in especially the early church on "creationism" vs. "traducianism"! ) Biolog- ically, conception and gestation in the hu- man species are quite like that in any mammal, and it is doubtful if we know significantly more about the process than Biblical man; yet this has never hindered the theological confessions. It might well be that in the broader reaches of creation titled "Has the Catholic Church Gone Mad?" (after the title of a recent book by that name by John Eppstein). One might be tempted to use recent Catholic experience to document the inevitability of a "camel's nose" or "domino" theory, and while the absolute heteronomy to radical autonomy crisis of authority in the Roman communion makes that situation rather unique, it does, indeed, underscore the indis- pensability of maintaining soh scriptma as well as sola gratis. we simply never had this sort of scientific information until recently, and the Bible could scarcely be expected to make a point of the "scientific" aspects in either case. (I did recently hear of a Lutheran pastor who was censured for teaching his confir- mation class that they came into existence, not by creation, but when their parents slept together - but that is obviously ec- centric.) The example of personal creation also exemplifies a broader point, viz., that im- manence and supernatural transcendence are not the mutual exclusives they are sometimes portrayed to be. In general, one may say that the Bible was more concerned to answer the questions, "Who?" and then "Why?" than "What?" and "How [em- pirically]?" even when it knew the answers to the latter questions, as, e. g., in Israel's wars versus "political or military science." God's "Word" obviously bespeaks both personal and supernatural elements, but at many points in the Bible it is seen as op- erative in "natural," secondary causation, as well as others where it is clearly a mat- ter of miracle in the stria sense. Nevertheless, both supernaturalism and the personhood of God are so central in the entire Biblical portrait that I can only greet with consummate alarm the various impulses to treat them a. matters of indif- ference, if not simply to demythologize them. Their prominence in King's effort is part of what makes her hypothesis as at- tractive as it is. She observes tellingly (p. 247) that if there is truth in Feuer- bach's observation that man creates God in his own image, our age would surely exemplify it in its depersonalization of God, consequent upon its depersonalization of man. It is often hard to distinguish CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 543 cause and effect, but prior rejection of the supernatural is surely one factor which has facilitated the acceptance of evolutionism from the outset. Obviously, both may be misconstrued: supernaturalism may veer toward magic, and God's personhood may be taken so literalistically that one forgets He is Spirit. Furthermore, the ultimate theological and existential import (soterio- logical) always transcends both, but that is far different from implying that they are in any way dispensable. As concerns ultimate origins, any crea- tionistic approach inevitably gets along bet- ter with an instantaneous or "big bang" theory than with a "steady state" or con- tinuous (eternal) creation approach (per- haps with eternal oscillation, or at least with matter always coming into being uni- formly throughout infinite time and space), if the latter is in any way harmon- izabk2" In nontheistic science itself, there 26 Thus both Pollard, op. cit., and King, op. cit. However Barbour, op. cit., refuses to take sides on the existentialist basis that the doc- trine of creation is redly only "about the basic relationship between the world and God" (p. 367). Elsewhere he is quite critical of this sort of dualistic escapism and generally inclines more toward process approaches. He argues that "both theories are capable of either a nat- uralistic or a theistic interpretation," but does observe that "defense of the infinity of time often displays a naturalistic 'metaphysical bias', as if nature, having taken the place of God, must itself be infinite." Very similarly, Roellig, (op. cit., p. 17) says: "It is the writer's view that the revival of the oscillation theory oc- curred more for philosophical than scientific reasons. Many cosmologists, it appears, find an eternal cosnological model more intellectually and theologica!ly satisfying t.han one that seems to start with a singular event." While Roellig disagrees with that approach, he too argues that it ultimately makes no difference because "re- gardless- the ultimate origin of all that makes up the universe is from the hand of God." seems to be no current unanirnity on this subject at aU If the continuous creation theory were to triumph, one could really assert that the pagan, mythological cosmogonies had finally triumphed over Biblical creationism. In fact, in many ways one could make a case for modern scienti~m as a reversion to paganism (its whole accent on nature and its universals, its immanentalism, its con- comitant culture's virtual worship of sex, etc.). It is also one of the many ways in which one observes that the basic philo- sophical options (probably ultimately only three: materialistic naturalism, idealistic ,pantheism, or Biblical creationism) are no different today than ever! Something like what we would call the "eternity of mat- ter" (in the Ancient Near East commonly pictured as a primordial ocean) is a staple of mythology (not unlike the givens or simple brute facts which science notes without being able to say why). Somehow (usually unspecified, but most crudely in the cosmogony of Heliopolis in Egypt, where Atum masturbates on the primeval hillock) the first male-female pair emerges to procreate and set in motion the "myth of the eternal return," the eternal cycle of life and death, summer and winter, etc., upheld by the cult's "celebration of life," fertility, and sexuality. Hence, it can and should be insisted, contrary to popular usage, that these are not "creadiort myths," because they really do not talk of "creation" at all, but of etcml generation, of cosmogoey, upheld and celebrated in the cultF6 "Creation" is really a Biblical term, that is a historical 26 Alexander Heidel makes this point very effectively concerning the Babylonian cosmogony in his BabylonMn Genesis (Chicago, 195 1 2). 544 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS term, presupposing a transcendent, personal deity of the unique, Biblical type, and we use "creation" of the mythological cos- mogonies only because our modern West- ern languages have been so informed by the Biblical heritage that they lack much genuine mythological conceptuality and vo- cabula~y.~~ If "creation" versus "cosmogony" some- what summarizes the profound difference between the Biblical and mythological (an- cient or some modern, "scientific") views, what about cosmology? This is always a sore point. The allegedly "primitive" and hence "erroneous" cosmology of the Bible (solid "firmament," flat earth set on pillars in a subterranean ocean) remains a point of debate. Bultmann has made the alleged three-story universe of the New Testament a major justification for demythologization. Surely, there is fundamental confusion here - not least with respect to the word - "myth." In general, one seems to have almost a party-caucus situation on this 27 There is the related question whether the Old Testament itself teaches credo ex nihilo. Cf. the commentaries and Old Testament the- ologies (which do not always agree with what follows). Barbour, op. cit., p. 384, has a good summary; he blames the accent on ex nihilo and the neglect of creatio continua for the later difficulty in understanding evolution as the means of creation. At best, many things would have to be sorted out here. I argue that that debate is largely one of semantics or other tech- nicalities. Prom a strictly, narrowly exegetical viewpoint one cannot demonstrate such teaching in Gen. 1 and elsewhere. However, the vocable bara already points strongly in that direction, and, above all, the internal "logic" in that direc- tion (building on Yahweh's personal, transcen- dent nature) is so strong that when Greek logic and philosophy became available to ex- press it abstractly, it seems to me that really it was no more than a formal, technical change in expression. question: either it is de riguew to insist that here we have parade examples of Bib- lical "error," or the opposite dogma. Even apart from dogma, I think the de- cision easily goes to the latter camp. One has such a variety of world-pictures in both testaments that one can scarcely but conclude that we must be dealing with ibopulav observation, often expressed poeti- cally, not with "science" in any sense. It is anachronistic and almost laughable even to try to apply that modern conceptuality to the Bible, but that seems very often to be the beginning of evil. Then one can scarcely but have low esteem for Biblical man in maintaining such mutually exdu- sive cosrn~logies.~~ Did they "believe" those cosmologies? I suppose in a sense they did - but as popular, not "scientific" descriptions. In that sense, 'inodern man" believes them too! (A certain parallel is offered in Biblical "psychology" - cer- tainly no "science," yet continued in our use of "heart," etc.) The neat German distinction between Weltbild and Weltmschazcung is somewhat helpful, if it does not eventuate in the thoroughgoing dichotomy that we have re- peatedly scored. Both within the Bible as well as afterwards, there are many "cos- mologies." Various ones have been current in "science" even in our lifetime, and prob- ably only a very few are simply incom- patible with creationism. Hence Bulunanu and company could scarcely be more wrong when they argue from three-story universe anthropomorphisms to the dispensability of the entire supernatural framework of 28 Ample documentation of this is given, I think, in: Carl Gaenssle, "A Look at Current Biblical Cosmologies," OM, October 1952, al- though one need not agree on all details. CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THJ3 LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 545 the Scriptures." Whether we speak of ultimate origins (or destinies) or of pres- ent structure, we can only say that we ultimately know little more about genesis than is written in the Book of Genesis. Theories galore, indeed, but nothing is proved. And so we believe. Gen. 2 and 3, however, with their greater accent on the creation of man, and also his fall, seem less amenable to this type of ap- proach than chapter one. The Hebrew text itself uses '"adam" both generically (with the definite article) and as a proper noun, thus suggesting a historical as well as a suprahistorical dimension. However, there seems no way around the argument that the Adam-Christ typology (not mere an- alogy!), as well as, in a way, the entire ordo sdutis, makes a historical element (in the ordinary sense of the term) a sine pa son for both Adm and the Fall. We not only are creatures; we also were created. We not only me fallen, but "in Adam's fall we sinned all." At very least, as outside limits, there would have to be tangible links with actual events at two points, at the beginning of time and at the creation of man - and hopefully much more. (In a way, this simply underscores the fact that 29 The pafallelism here of creation and resur- rection (or of creation and "new creation") is by no means coincidental. Together with the incarnation, they constitute perhaps the "gut" miracles of Biblical revelation, and it is no accident that in all three the claims and do- mains of science and religion, of objectivity and subjectivity, clearly intersect. Thus, I think it is not so much a matter of some inevitable "domino" effect on the other two if creation is spiritualized as it is that the fatal compromise with dualism and subjectivism has drendy been made. Nevertheless, it should be dear that we are not speaking primarily of fides qw (which only God can judge anyway), but of its noetics or doctrinal expression. the most basic clash between creationism and evolutionism is that of grace versus works, not other secondary ones which often attract more attention.) How this relates to the scientific infor- mation we seem to have is less than clear, but if one assumes that the text is "inno- cent until proved guilty," if you will (the precise opposite of course, of much "higher criticism"), the purely negative "evidence" we appear to have about "Adam" does not suffice to call historicity into question. I can only call attention here to probes attempting to relate this Biblical data to the appearance of homo sapiens, who alone was really 'han" and who had no real con- tinuity, except perhaps somewhat strucmr- ally, with anything that preceded. (In what has followed it certainly seems demon- strable that there has since been no "evo- lution" of man's native moral, aesthetic, and religious faculties parallel to his un- deniable technological progress - in flat contradiction to the facile meliorism which is at the heart of all that is objectionable in most popular evolutionism.) If a suprahistorical element may then be interwoven with the historical in Gen. 1-3, it is not the sole instance in the Bible. In no case is it a matter of simple reduction into mere existential truth ("of" God vs. "about" Him), but of the necessity of using analogical language to communi- cate "what eye hath not seen nor ear heard." This is true of all theology proper; it is true of the entire scenery of heaven; it is true of the miracle of inspiration; and, most similar of all, it is true of eschtology as of "protology" (creation). Creatures of space and time have no other way of speak- ing about what is above, before, after (or in any other way beyond) space and time. 546 CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS (Even if Gen. 1-3 ate taken as totally "scientific" description, it is doubtful if we "understand" one whit more; one be- lieves or he does not, in either case.) In all these cases, of course, we have no dearth of existentialists who reduce them to mere ciphers of "transcendental values" or the like, but I think that option is simply precluded for the confessional theologian. Until scientific evidence to the contrary arose within the past century, there was no justification for any suggestion that Gen. 1-3 in its literal sense should be treated somewhat like those other exam- ples, but if that does seem called for now, there are at least ample Scriptural parallels and precedents for such a construction without any break in $rinciple with she various aspects of Biblical and confes- sional hermeneutics. Our final considerations, then, must con- cern briefly the possible "form" in which the suprahistorical aspects of the protology were couched. The manifold formal paral- lels with especially the Mesopotamian ma- terials, as well as the profound difference in theological deployment, are nearly uni- versally recognized, although, of course, construed in various waysFO Of course, in confessional context it will not be a mere matter of "Israel's" confession, but also of objective, propositional revelation. Thus, if there is validity to the comparison of protology to eschatology, one may argue that just as God caused the "afiocalyptic" 30 Cf., c. g., two recent articles in the March 1972 Jownal of Biblical Literatuie (citing abundant other literature) on the name "Eve:' on the long problematic Gen. 4 : 1, and on the antedeluvian patriarchs of Gen. 5. Heidel, op. cit., and in his parallel study on the flood paral- lels in the Gilgamesh Epic, already conceded this clearly. form to be adapted for communication about the eschaton, so with some of the raw materials of the ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies for protological revelation. Culturally speaking, or considering the human, historical side of the revelation, it appears virtually impossible any longer to entertain the possibility, as is still some- times argued, that the influence of these narratives was from Israel to Mesopotamia, rather than vice versa. However, that theo- logical instinct is surely correct (if, for the nth time, it is not totally divorced from empirical history), and it can only be noted here that a cogent theoretical case can still be made for the hypothesis that ''primitive religion" is the corruption of an original monotheism, although it certainly is not a favored hypothesis in most "history of reli- gion" study (perhaps, one surmises, ulti- mately out of the same "haec opiio legisJJ motives that make melioristic evolutionism so attractive in general). We have enough extra-Biblical apocalyp- tic material to see quite clearly how se- verely that genre wzs pruned and purged before being used as a vehicle for revela- tion, and then likewise with the cosmog- onies. The "apocalyptic" genre has been recognized long enough that we have that universally recognized name for it, but in the case of zhe originally mythological ma- terials of Genesis we have, as yet, no com- monly agreed upon term (and, of course, if it is merely an alternate "myth," there is little reason why we should work at it). (Perhaps we should recall that "Gospel" too is a unique genre, quite without paral- lels in the Graeco-Roman world.) 31 At least until a decade or so ago, many Roman Catholics spoke of "allegorical history," that is, an account of events which really OC- CRITICAL METHODOLOGY AND THE LUTHERAN SYMBOLS 547 Whatever names we use, I am of the by spiritualism, has only begun. As for mind that work along these lines, that is, this article, however, like most, one never that ducks the problems neither by fiat nor really finishes, but only eventually gives up and stops. curred, but not in precisely the same way in which narrated. Involved in that label is the Valparaiso, Ind. Roman Catholic tradition of using "allegory" in a much more positive sense than usually in Protestantism. "Primal history" (often as an attempted translation of Urgeschichte) is also existentialist and dualistic traps. Are there other used, again with possibilities if it escapes the suggestions?