Concordia Theological Quarterly Volume 73:l January 2009 Table of Contents Editorial ................................................................................................................. 2 Maintaining the Lifeline of the Church: Pastoral Education for the Ministry of Spirit with the Word ....................................................................................... John W. Kleinig 3 Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy: Confessio Augustana XVIII, Philipp Melanchthon, and Martin Luther ............................................................................. Klaus Detlev Schulz 17 Vertical Typology and Christian Worship Horace D. Hummel .......................................................................... 41 Darwin at 200 and the Challenge of Intelligent Design Paul A. Zimmerman ............................................................................. 61 Research Notes ................................................................................................... 76 Was Junias a Female Apostle? Maybe Not Why Was Jesus with the Wild Beasts (Mark 1:13)? ........................................................................................ Theological Observer 81 Expelled The Death of a Christian: Membership Loss or Gain? Book Reviews ............................................................................................... 83 Books Received .................................................................................................. 95 Spirit, Righteousness, Typology, and Creation This issue contains a wide range of articles on themes that recur in theology. In our lead article, John Kleinig probes the importance of the Spirit's work through the word of God in the seminary curriculum. Seminary students and pastors can easily slip into understanding their use of God's word as "professional activity." Kleinig stresses the value of helping future pastors approach their life-long study of God's word in a devotional manner that sees it as the means by which the Spirit shapes and refreshes them for service in Christ's church. Luther's teaching about "two kinds of righteousness" has been receiving more attention in recent years. Detlev Schulz's article examines this theme in both Luther and Melanchthon. He demonstrates the unanimity that existed in their understanding of the first kind of righteousness (passive) but contrasts their respective understandings of the second kind of righteousness (active). Schulz stresses the kind of influence that moral philosophy had on the understanding of civil righteousness in both reformers, especially on Melanchthon's teaching of ethics as a rational pursuit of individual precepts. When we hear talk of "biblical typology," we typically think of its horizontal dimension (e.g., creation to new creation). Horace Hummel contributes an article on vertical typology, namely the patterning that exists in biblical texts between heavenly reality ("up there") and earthly reality ("down here"). He focuses especially on the vertical typology evident in Old Testament texts about worslup and then applies what is learned to understanding Christian worship. Although Paul Zimrnerman is known in our circles primarily for his service as the president of our colleges in Seward, Ann Arbor, and River Forest, he is also respected for his long-standing defense of the Genesis account of creation. In light of the publicity that Charles Darwin's 200th birthday will generate, Zimmerman has used his training in both theology and biology to challenge the theory of evolution once again. Not only does his article revisit Darwin and evolution, but it also engages the most recent research on intelligent design. These subjects resurface in Adam Francisco's discussion of the movie Expelled in the Theological Observer section. Readers will notice a new section in this issue of CTQ entitled Research Notes (pp. 76-80). These and future contributions will be brief summaries of recent research that may be of interest to our readers. We hope these notes enrich your continued study of theology. The Editors Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy: Corfessio Augustana XVIII, Philipp Melanchthon, and Martin Luther Klaus Detlev Schulz The two kinds of righteousness is an important feature of Lutheran theology. It correctly explains not only our salvation but also the role that ~hristians play in this world. "It is our theology," Martin Luther pointed out in his Lectures 071 Gnlatians (1535).1 "We teach," he continued, "a precise distinction between these two kinds of righteousness, the active and the passive, so that morality and faith, works and grace, secular society and religion may not be confused. Both are necessary, but both must be kept within their limits."' Philipp Melanchthon underscored Luther's approach in his short commentary on Romans, the Dispositio, by using the doctrine of the twofold righteousness as the key hermeneutical principle for Scripture, in particular for his interpretation of Romans: "It is very important to note in the study of all of Scripture that there are two kinds of righteousness."3 What makes the two kinds of righteousness theologcally challenging is that it draws in other Christian doctrines such as law and gospel, justification and sanctification, and the two kingdoms. Moreover, as Luther stated, the two kinds of righteousness help to cIarify the difference 1 Martin Luther, Llrfller'c Works, American Edition, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehrnann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955-1986), 26:7 [henceforth LW]. 2 LW26:7. Melanchthon's Disposifio orationis in Epistola Pauli ad Romanos was published as a complete work in February, 1530. See Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider and Heinrich Ernst Bindseil, eds., Copus Refontlaforum, Pllilij7 Melnrlchtltonis opera qune slcpersunt omnia, 28 vols. (Halle, later Braunschweig, 1834-1860), 15:443-191 [henceforth CR], quote found on 445. See Wilhelm Maurer, Historical Cornnlent~~ry on the Augsburg Confession, trans. H. George Anderson (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), 99,125. K. Detlezl Sclzulz is Clz~irnzan of the Depnrtmmt of Pastorn2 Ministry and Missions, Supemisor of tlze Ph.D. program in Missiology, and Dean of Graduate Stzld;~~ ~t Corlcordin nzeolog~cnl Scminnry, Fort Wayne, kdiana. 18 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) between faith, morality, vocation? natural theology, and philosophy. Thus, the second righteousness, the active one, carried out before humans and the world (corarn honzinibus or mundo), invites a review of social ethics and theological anthropology in comection to natural theology and moral philosophy. For natural theology and moral philosophy immediately surface as one contemplates the Christian's role in public life as he or she debates together with non-Christians the res publicae, the public concerns, as the ancient Romans called it. Isolationism, as proposed by Roman monasticism or the Anabaptists, was no option for Luther or Melanchthon. When Christians engage in matters of the res publicae, however, they must anticipate that others contribute toward society's welfare with the use of their free will (liberuni arbitrium) dictated by natural reason (ratio). Augustana XVlII on the "free will" anticipates that discussion.5 This article, I believe, is the seat of the twofold righteousness in the Lutheran Confessions.6 Augustana XVIII, however, leaves a lot unsaid and thus begs for further comments from Melanchthon's and Luther's writings on theological anthropology, particularly with respect to natural theology and moral philosophy. One important point is that, as we debate the second kind of righteousness coranz mundo, we should take into consideration the nuances made by both reformers. I. Augustana XVIII In Article XVIII of the Augsburg Confession and Apology, "Concerning Free Will," we have the locus for an articulated description of the twofold righteousness. There we read: Concerning free will they teach that the human will has some freedom for producing civil righteousness and for choosing things subject to reason. In Wlretlzr Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saued (1526), Luther debates the two kinds of righteousness in the context of the two kingdoms and the pursuit of one's vocation; see LW 46:lOO. 5 Particularly because Melanchthon's Commentary on Books 1 and 3 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics appeared in 1529. We will examine the 1546 edition of Melanchthon's commentary. 6 See Maurer, Historical Commentary, 89-101, and Giinther U'enz, Theologie der Bekennttrisscllriften der evangelisch-lutllerische,~ Kirclze, 2 vols. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 2457,463. The topic as found in the Apology is discussed by Charles P. Arand, "Two Kinds of Righteousness as a Framework for Law and Gospel in the Apology," Lutheran Quarterly 15 (2001): 420321. Explicit reference to the two kinds of righteousness is made in SD 111, 32, in 77z Book of Concord, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 567; for related comments to Augusta~~a XVIII, see Ap IV, 22 (Book of Concord, 124); LC I, 26 (Book of Concord, 389); LC I, 150 (Book of Concord, 407); LC II,13-16 (Book of Cot~cord, 432); and LC II,67 (Book of Concord, 440). Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 19 However, it does not have the power to produce the righteousness of God or spiritual righteousness without the Holy Spirit, because "those who are natural do not receive the @ts of God's Holy Spirit" [l Cor. 2:14]. But this righteousness is worked in the heart when the Holy Spirit is received through the Word.. . . They condemn the Pelagians and others who teach that without the Holy Spirit by the powers of nature alone, we are able to love God above all things and can also keep the commandments of God "according to the substance of the acts." Although nature can in some measure produce external works-for it can keep the hands from committing theft or murder -nevertheless it cannot produce internal movements, such as fear of God, trust in God, patience, etc.7 This article makes the important distinction of the two kinds of righteousness. The first righteousness comes through the Holy Spirit and the word. It is called the passive righteousness, the spiritual righteousness, or the righteousness of God (iustitia Dei). It is associated with internal movements, such as the fear of God, trust in God, and patience, which natural man cannot produce on his own. The other righteousness is that which humans create actively in the civil realm among one another by use of their free will and reason,s and through the outward performance of "good deeds." With the help of his pseudo-Augustine source,9 Melanchthon listed a number of specific "good works" by which all humans contribute to the welfare of society. He wrote: In Book 111 of Hypognosticon Augustine says this in just so many words: "We confess that all human beings have a free will that possesses the judgment of reason. It does not enable them, without God, to begin- much less complete-anything that pertains to God, but only to perform the good or evil deeds of this life. By 'good deeds' I mean those that arise from the good in nature, that is, the will to labor in the field, to eat and drink, to have a friend, to wear clothes, to build a house, to marry, to raise cattle, to learn various useful skills, or to do whatever good pertains to this life. None of these exists without divine direction; indeed, from him 7 CA XVIII, 1-3, 8-9; Book of Concord, 51, 53. 8 Often "will" is mentioned alone; in such cases "reason" is implied, e.g., CA 11, 3 (Bwk of Concord, 39). Augustine is frequently quoted to defend righteousness of faith and grace from the merit of works, CA XX, 13 (Book of Concord, 55). In Ap IV, 29-33 (Book of Concord, 125), references are made to his books On Nature and Grace (De natura et gratin) and On Grace and the Free Will (De gratia et libero arbitrio) to reject the Pelagian position on reason and will in the first kind of righteousness. 20 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) and through him they have come into being and exist. However, by 'evil deeds' I mean the will to worship an idol, to commit murder, etc."lo The concession to natural man's contribution raises this question: How positive and optimistic may one be to the actual reality of non-Christians promoting civil righteousness? In answering this, the context of Augustana XVIII is sigruficant. Though it may be argued that Article XVIII belongs with Articles XVI and XXVIII and sheds light on the proper relation of the civil to the spiritual realm-which it does-it is more closely tied to Articles I1 and XIX.ll Thus, the connection between Articles XVIII, 11, and XIX is that all three together define sin in terms of its nature, origin, and consequences particularly in reference to God. The overwhelming point of these three articles is to deny natural, post-lapsarian man any ability to establish a relationship with God. The first kind of righteousness is one freely bestowed by God. Therein Melanchthon dismissed the use of the free will and reason. With regard to the second righteousness, Melanchthon also factored in the reality of sin and its destructive powers, though not as harshly as in the first kind of righteousness. In Apology XVIII, he observed that "it is false to say that people do not sin when they do the works prescribed by the law outside of grace."l2 Prior to this he stated: "[Pleople more often obey their evil impulses than sound judgment. . . . For these reasons even civil righteousness is rare among human beings. We see that not even philosophers, who seemed to have aspired after this righteousness, attained it."'3 Later in the article Melanchthon cautiously conceded a practical reality of the free will in the second righteousness: " [A111 people alike ought to know that God requires civil righteousness and that to some extent we are able to achieve it."l4 Melanchthon's cautious concession "to some extent" was consistent throughout his study of moral philosophy. In his commentary on the Lutheran Confessions, Gunther Wenz ponders the actual probability of a free execution of the will coram mundo in view of man's sin. Does the sinful 10 CA XVIII, 4-7; Book of Concord, 51, 53: Similar comments are made in Ap XVIII, 4 (Bwk of Concord, 234). 11 Wenz, 7heologie, 2:89. Though Maurer frequently ties CA XVIII to CA XVI and XXVIII, his commentary gravitates towards the connection of CA XVIII to CA I1 and XIX; see Maurer, Historical Commentary, 271-283. 12 Ap XVIII, 5; Bwk of Concord, 234. 13 Ap XVIII, 5; Bwk of Concord, 234. 'up XVIII, 9; Book of Concord, 234. See also Ap IV, 23 (Book of Concord, 124), and Ap IV, 130 (Book of Concord, 141): "[Olutward works of the law can be carried out to some extent without Christ and the Holy Spirit." Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 21 corruption of the will of man, which constantly is curved away from and against God, not also negatively impact the second righteousness and relation to the world (coram rnund0)?~5 Melanchthon's answer was, as we saw, that the use of reason and will coram mundo can operate "to some extent." There is a freedom of choice- a freedom that is always tied to God in the sense that humans cannot pursue just any action as they please. But the reality of freedom and choice between two things is important since Melanchthon did not want his entire ethical project to topple. A11 humans are attuned to the divine law and are thus held accountable for their actions. Why was there this preponderance for Melanchthon to contemplate the will coram mtindo and coram Deo? In an important study entitled Der befreite Mensch: die Willenslehre in der Theologie Philipp Melanchf\1ons,"l6 Wolfgang Matz traces the idea of the will coram mundo in Melanchthon's theological and philosophical writings. For Melanchthon, the will played an important role in the lives of Christians and non-Christian5 not only because of his social ethics but also because he never abandoned psychology. As a result, he demanded an explanation of what happens to the reason and will as humans respond to natural law inscribed in their hearts and to Christians as they were transformed by the word and the Holy Spirit." Melanchthon pointed to the will either being the third or the fourth criterion in the line of one's conversion, with the word and Spirit being the first and second causes.18 By contemplating the role of the free will at various levels of human anthropology, Melanchthon created a great controversy in Lutheranism, which was finally resolved in Article I1 of the Formula of Concord. Indeed, the Formula of Concord acknowledges a "capan'fas passit>au for natural man and dismisses will as the third cause of one's conversion. In terms of the will in reborn man, the Formula of Concord concedes a "cooperatio," though in the relationship to the Spirit a Christian's will does not cooperate equally alongside it like two horses pulling a cart parallel to one another.19 In his study, Wolfgang Matz repat~iates Melanchthon into mainstream Lutheranism by arguing that Melanchthon never intended to compromise '5 Wenz, Theologie, 289. 16 Wolfgang Matz, Der befreite Mensch: die Willenslehre In der 7heologie Philipp Melancl~thons (Gijttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2001). I; Philipp Melanchthon, Loci Communes, 1543, trans. J. A. 0. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 96,104. lvReasun" was often listed as the third cause. " FC SD 11,66,90; Book of Concord, 556-557,561-562. 22 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) the word and Spirit as the primary source (prima causa). He would not posit the will even as a secondary cause (causa secunda eficiens) for one's salvation. It is the passive will without power (kraftlos) that is awakened and then led to perform good works in sanctification. Thus it is important to note the context of Melanchthon's argument. He was speaking of the will active through the Spirit in reborn man after his conversion, not in that of natural man nor during his conversion.20 Friedrich Bente, in his scathing critique of Melanchthon, did not engage this p0int.2~ The liberty that Melanchthon seemed to grant all humans coram n~uildo is limited to a good measure not only by the reality of sin but also for another reason. This reason is the issue of divine guidance, better known as determinism. A careful reader will note that in Augustana XVIII Melanchthon followed his appraisal of natural man's good works with the inserted phrase that "none of these [good works] exists without divine direction."22 What he stated here is that God actually remains in control as he guides and moves natural man according to his created abilities. One should observe that Melanchthon also invited, though only implicitly, the relationship of contingency and causality. Natural man exercises his freedom of the will in these external matters contingent on the use of his reason and surrounding circumstances. Nowhere did he feel God's absolute will compelling or coercing him to act; he perceives it as freedom. Nonetheless, the act ensues by necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae) of God allowing him to practice it.23 However, positing God as being active "behind the scenes," so to speak, does not make him the 20 Matz, Uer befrrite Mensch, 185,251. The Formula of Concord makes the following "dangerous" statement that would also be underwritten by Melanchthon without either partfintending to destroy the word and Spirit as the proper causes or insinuating that the natural will can do something prior to the work of the Spirit: "For conversion is such a change in the human mind, will, and heart affected by the Holy Spirit that the human being, through his activity of the Holy Spirit, can accept the grace offered"; see FC SD 11, 83; Book of Concord, 560. 21 Friedrich Bente contended that Melanchthon was "the father of synergism" among Lutherans, pointing to conhoversid statements such as the one Melanchthon made in his Explanation of the Epistle to the Romans (1532) on Romans 9:6 that "divine compassion is truly the cause of election, but . . . there is also some cause in him who accepts, namely, in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered"; see Bente, Historical Introduct~ons to the Book of Concord (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1965), 197. The controversial statement-"cause in him who accepts"-was omitted from his 1540 edition of the Explanation of tl2e Epistle to the Romans; see Philipp Melanchthon, Commentary on Roma?ts, hans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 8,189. CA XVIII, 6; Book of Concord, 51. 3 Matz, Der befreite Mensch, 16. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 23 cause of man's wrongdoing and of evil, as Erasmus of Rotterdam accused Lutherans. To evade that predicament, Melanchthon wrote in his Scholia only of an "nctio Dei generalis," a general guidance of creation through which God keeps all things flowing without robbing man of his freedom corarn mundo.24 As a result, Augustarla XIX can dismiss the thought of making God responsible for sin; sin comes about because of "the will of those who are mil, that is, of the devil and the urzgodly."2j Melanchthon asserted a relative freedom in the realm of the second kind of righteousness for his social ethics and, in this way, justified his investigation into pagan moral philosophy. He contemplated what benefit great philosophers have made towards the establishment of a righteous society, the iustitia ciuilis, through the use of reason. By claiming a freedom for man, Melanchthon held to a moral accountability and civil obedience for all people on the basis of the imputed natural law in their hearts (Rom 2:15). That would in turn warrant society's pursuit and punishment of wrongdoers who do not fulfill the usus civilis. With his moral philosophy Melanchthon proved that civil authorities had to be obeyed and that those who disturbed the peace of society had to be punished. Melanchthon's point was extremely important in the context of the peasant riots of 1525: by taking up arms against civil authorities, they had defied the laws of nature. With the use of pagan philosophy he made the point that it was necessary for all people to obey civil authorities." Scholars point out that the reason why Melanchthon inserted this passage on the liberuiu abitriuirl in Augustarzn XVlIl is that it offers both the traditional rebuttal of Pelagianism, as it pertains to an ability of the will in spiritual matters, but then also a correction of a philosophical prejudice against Lutheranism as a teaching that supposedly promotes anthropological determinism corarn n~unllo.~~ John Eck's criticism that Lutherans taught a bondage of the will in every area of life that bordered on fatalism or anthropological-determinism was addressed in Augustana XVIII, and it did the trick. It actually assuaged Eck and Iioman Catholic 2' Matz, Der befreite Men_sdr, 101. 25 CA X1X; Book of Cotlcord, 53 (emphasis added). In Ap XIX (B~wk ?f Concord, 235), Melanchthon omitted the phrase "nun adiuannte Deo" (apart from the assistance by God) lest readers conclude that God is the author of sin. 2b Sachiko Kusukawa, Ihe Transfomrution qf Nntltrnl Philosuphy: The Cnse of Pkiiipp Melarrchtl~on (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 71, and Matz, Der bqfreite Mensch, 106. 27 For Melanchthon's rejection of determinism in his studv of classical social ethics, xe thesis 22 of his Sumrnary of Etl~ics (1532), in Ptulipp hlelanchthon, A Melanchtllort Reader, trans. Robert Keen (New Y ork: Peter Lang, 1988), 214. 24 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) representatives at Augsburg who operated with their own understanding of moral philosophy in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.28 From what has been stated above, it is apparent that an interplay of important issues emerges as we contemplate the second kind of righteousness: the use of reason and free will, divine law and natural law, the reality of sin, and God's guidance that is deterministic though not perceived as such by humans. We can see the interplay of some of these aspects also in Luther's 011 the Borrdage uf the Will. 11. Luther's On the Bondage of the Will The complex history leading to Augustarza XVIII is highlighted most notably by Wilhelm Maurer in his Historical Conrnrentary on the Augsburx Corrfession29 and Gerhard Forde's recent commentary on Die Cnptrintiorz of the IVill.jo Briefly we should note that in his "403 Articles" John Eck listed some of the heresies of the Reformers, which included also an attack on Thesis 13 of Luther's "Heidelberg Disputation" (1518). Luther stated in this thesis that the "free will, after the fall, exists in name only, and as long as it does what it is able to do, it commits a mortal sin."jl Pope Leo X called upon Luther to retract this thesis in the bull of June 15, 1520. Luther repeatedly defended his position-such as with his "assertions"" of November 29,1520-which prompted also Erasmus of Rotterdam to enter the debate with his A Diatribe or Discourse corlcernir~g Free Choice (De libero arbitriu diatribe slile collmtio). Luther then responded with his famous tract On the Borrdage of the Will (De semo nrbitrio) in 1525.33 In this treatise, Luther argued that if freedom of the will is equal to the power (Mncht) of making choices, then it must be rejected totally. In terms of the two kinds of righteousness, one would have to say that Luther vehemently protected any intrusions on the first kind of righteousness. If man has the ability to earn grace, then that would be equal to works righteousness. Therefore, every human being must undergo a fundamental change, but man cannot bring about that change himself. God alone does it 'P SOI~~CCS orid Corltexts of tlw Book of Concord, ed. Robert Kolb and James A. Nestingen (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 116, and Wenz. Theologir, 2:89-90,92. '9 Maurer, Historical Coinrnentnry, 271-283. Gerhard 0. Forde, rile Cnptiilr~tiori of tl~r Will: Luther i,s. Emstrl~rs on Freedor71 nnd Bondage, ed. Steven Paulson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), especiallv 47-59. 31 LLL'31:73. 3' Martin Luther, "Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri per Bullam Leonis X. novissimam damnatorurn," in Lutl~ers Wrrke: Kritiscl~ Gesnr~itnlisgabe [Srlrr!ffenl, 65 vols. (Weimar: H. BOhlau, 1883-1993), 7:94-152 [henceforth WA]. 33 LW 33:3-294. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 25 by bringing someone to faith. Luther is intentionally radical in setting forth as passionately as possible the spontaneity of the relation between God, the Spirit, and the redeemed. He wrote: "The entry of the Spirit into one's life is not a polite choice but a radical change, something more like an invasion."" Alreadv before the switch to faith has occurred, Luther dismissed the thought of freedom. The will is bound to willing itself in one direction only. Thus, apart from God, man cannot "will anything but what he wills."3j When man is without God and the Spirit, he is not free but thrown under the power of Satan. To make the point, Luther used the famous illustration of man as a beast of burden that is ridden either by God or Satan.36 In other words, through God we become free, but without God we remain captive to the devil and sin. Theologically speaking, Luther allowed natural man no freedom of the will. The will tuns in one direction only, and that is decided for him either by the devil or by God.37 Thus with the reference point being God, grace, and salvation, Luther considered the talk of a free will a contradiction. Even to those matters pertaining to "below," where humans arrange life with one another according to the use of reason and the will, Luther considered the will ultimately captive also.% It may seem that we are free, but that freedom is deceptive. God allows us to act in freedom, yet he remains in control.39 Determinism was part of Luther's natural theology, hs understanding of history, and his view of who God is. God is almighty and responsible for a11 things that happen (Allwirksamkeit). Here Luther raised the issue of contingency and necessity. For what may seem man's own decision and contribution is in fact willed by God.$@Though Luther 3 Forde, Cnptiratioi~ of the Will, 59. 3j LMT33:65. LW33:65. ii Svend Andersen, Eltljulrrung in die Ethik (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 1.1.3. See LW 33:69 (emphasis added): "Free choice is allowed to man only with respect to what is beneath him and not w-hat is above him. That is to say, a man should know that with regard to hs faculties and posscssions he has the right to use, to do, or to leave undone, according to his own free choice, thoridr men tlris is controlled bv the free choice of God alone, who acts in whatever way he pleases." LW33:139. See LI.2' 33:37-36 (emphasis oripal): "From this it follows irrefutably that everything wc do, everything that happens, even if it seems to us to happen m;tably and contingently, happens in fact nonetheless necessarily and immutably, if you have regard to the will of God. For the will of God is effectual and cannot be hindered, since it is the power of the divine nature itself; moreover it is wise, so that it cannot he deceived. . . . Moreover, a work can only he called contingent whenfro~n orir point ofi'ierc it is done contingently and, as it were, by chance and without our expecting it, because 26 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) conceded man a freedom in things "below," that freedom need not be exaggerated, and it should not compromise the underlying determinism in Luther's theology and concession that God is almighty. Though the individual seems to regulate his life on the basis of his own choices and is unaware of God in his life, God is in control, right down to all things "beneath."" In this way Luther left nothing to fate or to causality, in other words, that all things run along their own laws (Gesefzlichkeit) and are explicable to reason. One can see here how theodicy and predestination turn out to be important aspects of Luther's theology and worldview. Ultimately, however, Luther found great consolation for all Christians who are troubled over the course of matters in this world in the fact that all things are taken care of by God's almighty wi11.Q As Gerhard Forde points out, readers generally find Luther's use of the image of the beast of burden objectionable because of a general antipathy towards any idea of bondage.43 Liberty and free choice are greatly treasured by any civilized society. Yet Luther opened his treatise On the Botidage of the Will with the caveat that the proper Christian way would be to drop the term "free will" or free choice from the vocabulary altogether.& With that being said, however, Luther still entertained a positive use of the ratio and philosophy in the earthly realm, as he contemplated the second kind of righteousness in the context of natural law and the Decalogue. First, though, we begin with Melanchthon's view of this matter. 111. Comparing Natural Law and the Decalogue When it comes to the second kind of righteousness in Augr~stanu XVIII, Melanchthon's contemplations on moral philosophy and natural theology served as an important backbone. In the following section we will consider a few readings that seem pertinent to the subject, namely, Melanchthon's commentary on Aristotle's Nicolnnclrean Ethics (1546), hs Szrmlnn y of Ethics (1532), and both editions of his Loci Communes (1521/1543). Melanchthon's discussion of natural law is found in his Loci Co~nrnunes of 1521 and 1543. His Loci Cononunes found great approval from Luther as our will or hand seizes on it as something presented to us by chance, when we have thought or willed nothing about it previously." i1 LC$' 33:364, and Gerhard Rost, Der Pradpistir~atiorislpedanke in der 7keologie Martin L~ltl~rrs (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1%6), 61-62. LM733:12. -1Vorde, Cuptioatiorr oftke Will, 4839. * LW 3337. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 27 the book every student should read next to the Bible.45 In another place he suggested that it deserved not only to be immortalized but canonized.& In his 1521 edition, Melanchthon offered his definition of natural law as follows: "A natural law is a common judgment to which all men alike assent, and therefore one which God has inscribed upon the soul of each man, adopted to form and shape character."4' This law of nature is common knowledge to all humans and has as its goal that all derive their morality from it. The knowledge of natural law and the ability to distinguish between good and evil is more than a mere biological endowment (habitus) or certain impulses that humans have in common with the "brute beasts" such as the "preservation and production of life."a Natural laws and the knowledge of them are imprinted on human minds because they were created in the image of God. Even if that knowledge were corrupted by the fall and did not shine forth as clearly among people as it originally did, it is not entirely extinct. Humans have a practical reason that can identify the principles or individual laws (capita) for conduct just as one uses numbers and does additions. Those rules should be deduced from common principles and human reasoning through syllogism^.^^ In addition, there should be wise men, philosophers, and teachers in every society who know of them and promote them through proper education. In his 1521 Loci Cornrnunes, Melanchthon summarized the natural laws as follows: I. Love God.% 11. Because we are born unto a kind of common society, injure no man but assist whomever you may with kindness. 111. If it cannot be that no man is injured, let this be done in order that the smallest amount of people be injured by the removal of those who disturb the public peace. For this duty let magishates be appointed, and punishments for the guilty be instituted. 4; LW 54:440, and Heinz Scheible, "Philipp Melanchthon," in nre Refonnation 'I7wologinns: An Introduction to %ology in the Early Modem Period, ed. Carter Lindberg (Oxford, LJK, and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 71. 6 LW 3342. 4' Philipp Melanchthon, rile Loci Communes of Philipp Melanchthor~ [1521j, trans. Charles Lemder Hill (Boston: The Meador Press, 19441, 112. In his 1543 edition, Melanchthon defined natural law as follows: "The law of nature is the knowledge of the divine law which has been grafted into the nature of man"; see Loci Communes (1543), 70. 48 Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1521), 113. 49 Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1521), 111; Loci Communes (1543), 70. 3 It is difficult to imagine that Melanchthon would accept an ability in natural man to love God when he underscores elsewhere that this act is not possible without the righteousness of faith; see Ap N, 18; Book of Concord,lB. Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) IV. Divide property for the safety of public peace. As to the rest, let some alleviate the wants of others through contracts.51 In his Loci Communes of 1543, Melanchthon outlined the individual laws of nature by comparing them to the Decalogue. For him natural law finds its truest expression in the Decalogue: Thus the first law of nature itself acknowledges that there is one God, who is eternal, wise, just, good, the Creator of things, kind toward the righteous and punitive toward the unrighteous, by whom there has been ingrafted into us the understanding of the difference between good and evil, and that our obedience is based on this distinction; that this God is to be invoked and that good things are to be expected from Him.52 According to Melanchthon, this law was argued against atheists by Xenophon, Cicero, and other men like them. Even the second and third commandments of the first table were defended in ancient Rome and Athens. The God invoked is to be honored and worshipped and his name may not be taken in vain since pe jury will lead to punishment. In fact, the virtues known to man, such as righteousness, chastity, truthfulness, moderation, and kindness, should not only promote a lawful and just society but should also be kept for the sake of worshipping God.53 The laws of the second table of the Decalogue also find their evidence in natural law. Human reason recognizes that in society there is a need for order and direction. That sense of direction and order is first imprinted upon humans through the authority of parents and then later added to rulers who govern and defend entire society.% The fifth commandment prohibits all evil violence which harms anyone. The sense for justice has been divinely instilled in men from the beginning of humanity, as the story of Cain and Abel shows. Murder is forbidden and must be punished by the magistrate. In regard to the sixth commandment, reason shapes life for humans in a way that beasts do not share. Human reason supports marriage and therefore disapproves of adultery and "moving from one bed to another."5"n terms of the seventh commandment, human reason is aware that the distinction of ownership applies to man's very nature and must be protected through legal methods. This has been identified in the past by philosophers who have called for the distinction of ownership and right of property. In regard to the eighth commandment, it has been 51 Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1521), 116. iZ Melanchthon, Loci Contntunes (1543), 71. 53 Melanchthon, Loci Con~munes (1543), 71. 54 Melanchthon, Loci Cornmunes (1543), 71. 55 Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1543), 71. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 29 grafted into human reason that we should love and maintain the truth and avoid lying. That principle is followed strongly by the courts, which seek to establish and preserve the truth. Melanchthon specifically chose to compare the Decalogue to natural law in order to prove that their substance is essentially the same. The laws of nature are just like those of the Decalogue: they are divinely instituted and promoted for good order in societies through their proper authorities.% Melanchthon's high regard for the Decalogue was based on the fact that it was specially proclaimed from heaven "so that God might testify that He is the author of this natural knowledge," and that he wants obedience in accordance with the natural knowledge of these laws.j7 Finally, human reason has been weakened and, to a degree, misled by sin; thus, needs further enlightenment from the Decalogue.5" Melanchthon approved of the Decalogue so highly that one is inclined to ask, "Why does Melanchthon not demand that the government, as custodian of both tables, explicitly promote the Decalogue itself?" Nevertheless, Melanchthon abstained from imposing a theocratic system on society based on the Decalogue. It seems that Melanchthon stopped himself from going so far, not because of the distinction of both kingdoms, but rather because his survey of classical society built on the Roman law (romisches Reclrt) revealed it to be enough of a promotion of natural law, the ius gentium. Roman law clearly is the highest product of human reason and of true moral philosophy. In fact, Melanchthon expressed his personal wish that the innate ideas that underlie the Roman jurist tradition would remain in the political philosophy of rulers at his time.j9 IV. Moral Philosophy The basis for Melanchthon's above comments and observations is the argument that the divine law exists as natural law and can be promoted in society through those who are wise enough to pursue moral philosophy. In his Summary of Ethics, he defined moral philosophy as "the complete awareness of the precepts of the duties of all the virtues, which reason understands agree with man's nature and which are necessary for the conduct for this civil life."m Philosophy, he stated, is the study and 5 CA XVI; Book ofCacord, 49. 5' MeIanchthon, Loci Corrrrnunes (1543), 72. 58 Melanchthon, Loci Communes (1543), 72. j9 Kusakawa, 7%e Transformation of Nat~irnl Philosophy, 70, and Werner Elert, .Morphologie des Lutlzertums, 2 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1953), 2:M. tn Melanchthon, A Melanchthon Render, 203, and Elert, Morphoiogie, 2:334-350. 30 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) promotion of the laws of nature itself that have been written by God in men's minds. In other words, for Melanchthon there was a congruency between the 1e.x naturalis and the rlzens divina. Natural law is God's law, used by him to order civil life. Philosophy is thus an explanation of the laws of God, as far as reason understands law, particularly the second table of the divine law.61 Christians do well to study philosophy since it is "called part of the divine law and the explanation of the law of nature."62 Christians should know, however, that they are justified freely through Christ and not through law or philosophy.63 Melanchthon also approved of moral philosophy's investigation of man's end or goal of life through reason and the promotion of virtues. According to Aristotle, the end or goal must be defined as happiness guided by the virtue of moderation through the will.@ But the pursuit of happiness plays a role only corarn mundo, namely within the laws of outer and civil life. For, theologically speaking and according to the gospel, man's end is to "recognize and accept the mercy offered through Christ, and in turn to be grateful for that gift and obey G0d.''6~ Though every human is endowed with reason, the ability to connect the correct virtue or habit to a law resides especially with the wise and learned.hh As he did in his Loci, Melanchthon applied philosophy and the study of virtues to the tMro tables of the Decalogue. Even if philosophy has shortcomings, particularly about God since faith and love are lacking, it counts the fear of God and a certain amount of external reverence for God among the virtues. In regard to the second table of the law, Melanchthon praised important virtues that have positive effects on civil life and preserve society. Cicero and Aristotle also recognized these within their categories of virtues: the first category of the second table revolves around human order, which calls for the virtues of obedience, piety, and justice. The second precept teaches about physical soundness; thus, "do not kill" calls for gentleness. The third precept deals with marriage, thus continence applies. The fourth concerns property; here generosity applies. The fifth, concerning truth, calls for all virtues.6' Melanchthon, A MelancJzfllon Render, 204, Thesis 2. hlelanchthon, A Melnnchtl~on Render, 204, Thesis 3. h3 Melanchthon, A Melnr~ciit!ion Reader, 204, Thesis 3. a Melanchthon, A Melanchthon Reader, 205, Thesis 6. 65 Meliinchthon, A ,2?elnnckt/1on Reader, 205, Thesis 6. " Melanchthon, A Melanchthoii Reader, 210, Thesis 14. 6' Melanchthon, A Melnnclltllon Reader, 209, Thesis 13, and 8. A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in tire n?eology of L~rther (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1962), 35. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 31 It is important to note that Melanchthon's appraisal of antiquity builds on the use of the judgment of the mind and free will coram mundo. Melanchthon contemplated moral philosophy with the idea of a societas. Man is not created as an individual alone but for society. Every human needs to be engaged in mutual communication of affairs with others so that from it emerge justice and honesty. Here Melanchthon, and Luther also, praised the Aristotelian aequitas or in~ci~ticx that enforces the laws equitably and reasonably and serves society best. For example, in the context of the peasant revolution in the 15205, aequitas would distinguish between the instigators and those who were forced to join. In all areas where laws are applied, the will must make proper choices based on the judgment of reason.68 Melanchthon rejected determinism and the divine governance theory that diminish the dual liberty of the will. Liberty is not removed with the argument or reference to sin, even if sin causes man to struggle against so many bad emotions.69 However, though Melanchthon applauded Cicero and Aristotle for having made correct advances in the area coram mundo, there is an inexplicable factor in their moral philosophy. Philosophy cannot explain the cause of human failure and the weakness of nature or why faulty emotions come in and impede a good act. Philosophy's perplexity is real because of a denial of the reality of original sin.70 Melanchthon was aware that the metaphysical constructs of philosophy are inadequate in explaining the phenomenon called sin and why the virtue or goal of happiness, as AristotIe upholds, is so often missing among people. In the eleventh chapter of his commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Melanchthon did not leave the explanation of unhappiness as a cause of circumstance and misfortune but frames it within law and a Melanchthon, A Melanhfhon Reader, 210, Thesis 13, and Elert, Morphologte des Lutllertums, 2341-350. 69 Melanchthon, A Melanchthon Reader, 214 and 215, Thesis 22: "[N]evertheless we are able to control and do our honest outer deeds by ourselves. . . . Thus some liberty still remains in men for choosing honest external acts, even if it is not without difficult$ that natural weakness is conquered . . . and these outward good deeds are called civil or moral virtues." 70 Melanchthon, A Meianshthon Reader, 214, Thesis 22. "Philosophy cannot adequately explain this question, since good fortune is supposed to reward virtue. The reason that does not happen is unknown to philosophy, since human nature is oppressed by sin, and for that reason is subjected to huge tribulations; but the gospel teaches us that they are happy in this 1ife.who have the beginning of light and justice and the first fruits of eternal life, and the guidance and protection of God. Meanwhile they bear the harshest struggles and calamities. Later when sin and death are truly abolihed they will have absolute peace. But the gospel Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) Thus, for Melanchthon, the gospel is the answer to all those stricken by sad things. For those in a state of unhappiness, such as having experienced the loss of a child, happiness can still be found in the gospel. It is evident that Melanchthon did not follow the same purpose as Aristotle in his commentary on the Alicornrrcheari Etliics and in his Szonlni~~y of Ethics. AS he confined moral philosophy to corafn mur~do, he repeatedly brought in his theological and Christian point of view.72 Elert claims that Melanchthon entertained an idealism and utopianism of a just and perfect society built on classical moral philosophy.73 His theologcal bearing, however, came across strong in the area of harmatology that denied him utopianism. In other words, though Melanchthon saw the usris politiczls legis at times fulfilled by non-Christians, he proceeded to compare their laws and behavior to the zlslis in renatis and revealed some outstanding issues among non-Christians. At the same time, we notice-as we did in Augustnrzn XVlII already-that Melanchthon never went so far as to disqualify the works of natural man coram nrundo as useless and bad works. As a result, after the publication of his Sclrolia on Colossians in 1527, Melanchthon confidently made philosophy productive for, and sewant to, theology in the context of civil justice and morality.74 V. Luther and Natural Law Both Melanchthon's and Luther's presentation of moral philosophy and natural law have the distinct feature of drawing a comparison between natural law and the Decalogue. A noticeable aspect of that comparison is how Melanchthon itemized the law both for non-Christians and Christians. The Decalogue was reflected in the specific laws of pagan moral philosophy. Though Luther acknowledged the identification of the Decalogue and natural law, he went further and summarized or condensed all natural laws and the Decalogue into one law, the law of love. Luther came to that conclusion by comparing the relationship between the laws of nature, the Decalogue, and the New Testament. This reasoning is most lucidly discussed in his tract Ho7i1 Christians SI~ollld Reprd Moses.'; To Luther, the Ten Commandments agreed with natural law and are a says that it is not in the human power in this life, which is subject to death and the stings of the devil, to pursue the sure conjunction of virtue and good fortune"; see Melanchthon, A Melanchfl~on Reader, 198, Chapter 11. 'Watz, Der befreite Mensch, 200. 73 Elert, Morphologie cIes Llithertuins ,2:31. 7* Matz, Der befreife Mensdi, 100 and 238. 7' LW35:159-174. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 33 good summary of it. Both the Ten Commandments and natural law, however, agreed with the dual commandment of love in the New Te~tament.-~ He thus asked: "Why does one then keep and teach the Ten Commandments? Answer: Because the natural laws were never so orderly and well written as by Moses. Therefore it is reasonable to follow the example of Moses."; The commandments of Moses, however, derive their validity only because they are in agreement with the laws of nature and the New Testament: "Thus I keep the commandments which Moses has given, not because Moses gave the commandment, but because they are implanted in me by nature, and Moses agrees exactly with nat~re."~s Elsewhere he wrote: "We will regard Moses as a teacher, but we will not regard him as a lawgiver- unless he agrees with both the New Testament and the natural law."'9 Luther placed the laws of the Decalogue in relation to natural law and the law of loving your neighbor. He found in the Golden Rule and the dual commandment of love a good summary of the laws of nature and the Decalogue. Thus, the prescriptions of the Old Testament have lost their special status. All prescriptions that exist in the Old Testament were understood as the laws of the Jews, as their "Sachsenspiegel." Just as little as the Saxon laws (S~iihsenspiegel) apply to the French, so too the Old Testament laws cannot be binding for Christians.60 What is binding in the 76 When in the Sermon on the Mount Jesus summarizes the Old Testament laws in the Goldell Rule, it is indicative of the law of Moses being an expression of the natural law: "Thus, 'Thou shalt not lull, commit adultery, steal, etc.,' are not Mosaic laws only, but also natural law written in each man's heart, as St. Paul teaches (Rom. 2 [:15]) Also Christ himself (Matt. 7 [:12]j includes all the Ian7 and the prophets in this natural law, 'So whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.' Paul does the same thing in Rom. 13 [:9], where he sums up all the commandments of fvfoscs in the loye which also the natural law teaches in the words, 'Love your neighbor as yourself"'; see Against the Heazlenhj Proyl~ets, in LW40:97. ZAg~lirtst the Wrni~er~l!~ Propllets, in L1,Y 40:9S. ;W~orc Cllri.;tinrlz Slro~ild Regard ,bfosps, in LLV35:168. 7y L1\'35:165. HWL?~, CI~riitia~ls Sl~ei~!~i R~gilrii MOSES, in 1 W35:167. Luther made similar statements on the Sachsenhpiegel in Ap1iiit;t Hen:>o~l!l Propl~rts in tll? hli~tter dlnzages ilnd Sacrurne?its, e.g,, in LW 40:97: "Therefore %loses' legislation about images and the sabbath, and what else goes beyond the natural law, since it is not supported bv the natural law, is free, null and void, and is specifically given to the Jewish people alone. It is as when an -. emperor or a king makes sFecidl laws and ordinances in his territory, as the Sncltsenspiegel in Saxony. . . . Therefore one is to let Moses be the Sachsmcpiqel of the Jews and not to confuse us gentiles with it, just as the Snclrer~~pie~el is not observed in France, though the natural^ law there is in agreement with it." See also Anderxn, Eil!fiilrr~rn~ it7 die Etllik, 108-110. 34 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) Old Testament for the Christian are those laws contained in the Decalogue, but they are meaningful for Christians insofar as they explicate the law of love. These insights are an important commentary to the few positive statements Luther made on reason and its use in the context of worldly affairs, insofar as it does not interfere with the first kind of righteousness. On these occasions when reason pertains to spiritual matters and true knowledge of God, Luther made derogatory statements calling reason both blind and the devil's maid.8l Sadly, humans always tend to bring their contributions to the second kind of righteousness into the spiritual realm. Luther saw much of that interference occurring precisely in the philosophy of Aristotle, particularly in the theological discourses of Scholasticism. This is evident in the use of the term synfheresis by Scholastic theologians, who claim that natural reason apart from faith can attain true knowledge of God.82 Luther, however, conceded to reason (mtio) a relationship with God via natural law. The preaching of the fully revealed law of God does not strike onto a barren field. As Luther stated: "If the Natural Law had not been inscribed and placed by God into the heart, one would have to preach a long time before the consciences are touched."83 It further presupposes that Luther often praised reason as the greatest gift given by God to mankind. That statement must be seen in the context of society and the first article on creation. In the worldly realm, reason is given supreme authority. It serves man to exercise his dominion over the world to plan, organize, and rule society. Even after the fall, reason has the ethical ability of recognizing what is required and what is good and bad. Reason informs every human that he may not steal, fornicate, or withhold property from others. In other words, reason must rule over the "spoiled flesh of man." In this way the pursuit of moral things (moralin) will lead to a iustitia ciui1is.a This applies also to the passing and enforcing of laws. The codification of laws is a reflection of the divine laws in man's heart. No special revelation is needed because God the Creator endowed rulers and magistrates with reason to apply the laws. Ultimately, therefore, lawgivers are accountable 8' Bernhard Lohse, Ratio und Fides: Eine Untersucllrrng iiber die ratio in der nwolope L~ct\wrs (Gottingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1958), 72. 82 Lohse, Ratio lrrld Fides, 47. 83 Martin Luther, Dr. Martin Llrtllers Sammtliclle Sclrrifferl, ed. Joh. Georg Walch (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1894), 3:1053. See also David J. VaUeske);, We Believe, 77wrqfore We Speak: The Thology nnd Practice of Evnngelisn~ (Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing How, 2004), 24, and Lohse, Rntio lrnd Fides, 83. Lohse, Ratio und Fides, 122-123. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 35 to God, and in the end they do not create laws but receive them as God's gift (accepi not feci)." Thus Luther did not come up with a formal-biblicist understanding of suggesting which laws government should impose. This explains why heathens sometimes have better laws than the Jews.% VI. Motivation and Christological Bases in Luther In his seminal study Ratio und Fides, Bernhard Lohse shows that Luther distinguished the ratio of serving law in society and upholding the justice of society (Kechtsordnung des Staates) from the renewed ratio (renovatio mentis) of a Christian guided bv the Christian understanding of love.a7 Even if the distinction between Christian and non-Christian exists, however, it does not make much of a difference in the promotion of worldly matters. Here Luther did not separate the ratio of a non-Christian and that of a Christian. Such an attempt would land one in enthusiasm. Like faith, a Christian's reborn reason is hidden and not visible. For Luther and Melanchthon, all ethical discussion oriented itself not so much toward the act itself, which both Christians and non-Christians share, but far more deeply toward the motivation (Gesinnung) behind it. What matters is the motivation of love through faith in Christ, whch natural reason 1acks.m Thus as far as motivation goes, the two kinds of righteousness are not disconnected for Melanchthon or Luther. That connection lies in the inner motivation stemming from faith in Christ. Faith, as a gift of God, receives the righteousness of Christ and then brings forth good fruits in the civil realm. This implies that from a theological perspective one would expect Christians to contribute towards the second righteousness with the purest intentions, insofar as the motivation goes. Luther made this distinction in the preface to his commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans when he called human deeds laclung proper motivation, "human law," and those done from the bottom of the heart, "divine law."sg 83 Maurer, Historical G?tnmrntary, 115-118. % Lohse, Ratio ltnd Fiiies, 131. R7 Lohse, Rntio lcnd Fiiies, 13. lohse, Rnfio u11d Fides, 132. 89 "The little word 'law' you must here not take in human fashion as a teaching about what works are to be done or not done. That is the way with I~uttzan 11~7~'~; a law fulfilled by works, even though there is no heart in the doing of them. But God judges according to what is in the depths of the heart. For this reason, his law too makes its demands on the inmost heart; it cannot be satisfied with works, but rather punishes as hypocrisy and lies the works not done from the bottom of the heart. Hence all men are called liars. . . . For everyone finds in himself displeasure in what is good and pleasure in what is bad. If, now, there is no willing pleasure in the good, then the inmost heart is 36 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) In this point, Luther went further than Melanchthon by highlighting the christologrcal basis for his ethics. It seems that the distinction between a Christian and non-Christian's reason motivated by love cornrrl riiundo was more pronounced in Luther than in Melanchthon. TO be sure, Melanchthon also offered a decidedly Christian perspective by highlighting the Holy Spirit and faith as the basis for Christian acti0n.m But he did not underscore the christologically based and motivated ethic as intentionallv as Luther. In his treatise on the TWO Kinds of Rigltteousness (1519), ~uther made it abundantly clear that a Christian assumes a Christ-like unselfishness in practicing his love for the neighbor. Christians pursue the second kind of righteousness because faith becomes active through love. Although the second kind of righteousness cannot stand in front of God's throne, it matters a great deal for Chnstians as they engage with their neighb~r.~l For Christians, this second kind of righteousness becomes particularly meaningful in light of Philippians 2:5: "Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus." What followed for Luther is what we may call a "putting-on-the-mind-of-Christ" in a self-effacing or kenotic way. The second kind of righteousness flows from the righteousness that ~hrist earned on the cross and leads a Christian to total dedication or surrender of service in the example of Christ. Luther explained this further with this statement in Two Kill& ofRigl~teousrress: This righteousness is the product of the righteousness of the first type, actually its fruit and consequence. . . . It hates itself and loves its neighbor; it does not seek its own good, but that of another, and in this its whole way of living consists. For in that it hates itself and does not seek its own, it crucifies the flesh. Because it seeks the good of another, it works love. Thus in each sphere it does God's will, living soberly with self, justly with neighbor, devoutly toward God. This righteousness fol1ou.s the example of Christ in this respect [I Pet. 2:21] and is transformed into his likeness (11 Cor. 3:lB). It is precisely this that Christ requires. Just as he himself did all things for us, not seeking his own good but ours only - and in this he was most obedient to God the Father -so he desires that we also should set the same example for our neighbors.9' To a degree, Luther's strong christological perspective comes to bear in his On Temporal Authority (1523) where he optimistically embraced the idea that if society were comprised only of Christians there would be no need not set on the law oj God. Then, too, there is surely sin, and Cod's wrath is dcsenled, even though outwardly there seem to be many good deeds and honorable life"; see LM! 35:366. " Matz, Der befrcite Merrsclt, 203-205. 91 FC SD I11,32; Book of Colzcord, 567. 92 LW 31:299-300. Schulz: Two Kinds of Righteousness and Moral Philosophy 37 for the use of the law. For the law was placed by God to control and curb the sins and aggressions of non-Christians.93 Here Luther offered his own utopianism of a Jesus-disciple society where Christians in complete freedom from the law follow the laws as if there are no laws. Christians respond to the viva lex, that leads them to act voluntarily and unselfishly, motivated by love for the neighbor.% Nevertheless, he realized for himself that a utopian society would and could never exist. Christians are spread too thin in society in the midst of evil and lawless people, and even Christian hypocrites find their home among sincere Christians. Thus, Christians should not seek isolation but rather endure and bear the cross for all the evil incurred on them. Christians live in that eschatological tension of enduring the present and waiting for what is still to come. In addition, the call to daily repentance would involve Christians also so that among them too the ideal is dampened by the reality of sin. As Elert points out, repentance and eschatology always accompany the Lutheran ethos as an important corre~tive.~j For Luther, both Christians and non-Christians share common social and ethical concerns, but they come to it from different angles. The contribution towards civil righteousness by a Christian is christologically motivated and a result of faith attributed to the Holy Spirit, whereas for non-Christians it is a response to the law of love as a summary of the natural law (lex naturalis).% This distinction would allow us to debate the particular aspects of a Christian's role as the righteous in society,97 even if his sinfulness and shortcomings remain just as much an issue in the second kind of righteousness as it does with non-Christians. 93 "The law has been laid down for the lawless . . . so that thow who are not Christians may through the law be restrained outwardly from evil deeds"; see LW45:90. "Those who belong to the kingdom of God are all true believers who are in Christ and under Christ. . . . These people need no temporal law or sword. If all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, there would be no need for or benefits from prince, king, lord, sword, or law"; see LW4538-89. 93 Elert, Morpirologie des Lut/wrtums, 223, and Wolfgang Trillhaas, ENzik (Berlin: Alfred TBpelmann, 1959), 23 and 29. The ethicist Paul Ramsey discusses the question: "How can there be a Christocentric vocation without withdrawing an individual quite completely from actual tasks in the world?"; see Bnsic Christian Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 153. 96 In this refined way, Luther suggested early on in his career that we should distinguish between three kinds of righteousness, as he elicits in his Sermon on nzree Kinds of Righteoortsness (1518), WA 2:W,32-38; see Robert Kolb, "Sermo de triplici iustitia," Concordin journal 33 (2007): 171-172. 97 Timothy Saleska, "The Two Kinds of Righteousness!: What's a Preacher to Do?" Concordia Jozcrnal33 (2007): 141. 38 Concordia Theological Quarterly 73 (2009) sinfulness and shortcomings remain just as much an issue in the second kind of righteousness as it does with non-Christians. VII. Conclusion Augustma XVIII broadens the theological scope by pairing a Christian's contribution to uphold the second kind of righteousness in society to that of non-Christian citizens. Melanchthon draws into that discussion his approval of moral and social philosophers from antiquity, such as Aristotle and Cicero. He views classical philosophy positively and as relevant to Christian thought but without compromising his Christian perspective. Though he is willing to entertain an ideal society based solely on natural law and moral philosophy, he also sees the shortcomings of pagan moral philosophy, in that it fails to take into account the reality of sin, and he concedes that the freedom endowed to natural man is due to God's providential care as limited and restricted. Melanchthon's social project is interesting in that he does not consign the "remnant knowledge" of natural man after the fall to an indefinable mess. A reader notices how studiously Melanchthon went about to prove the point that the natural law in the life of all humans is encoded in specific laws. The revelation of law has occurred for all humans, for non- Christians and Christians. Moral philosophy itself is not a purely human study of that divine law; it actually operates with revelation. To Christians, revelation has come through the Decalogue. A comparative study of natural law and the Decalogue shows that there is a closeness between them. To be sure, the Decalogue was a clearer and more helpful addition in the context of the second lund of righteousness. That insight, however, did not diminish the commonality between both Christians and non- Christians. Both parties are in possession of the divine law and together assume civil and moral responsibility with the use of their reason. In fact, in the realm coram mundo it seems as if Melanchthon makes little difference between the reason of those who believe and of those who do not. In both cases, there is the responsibility for moral conduct on the basis of divine law.9Whristians cannot automatically possess an additional sixth sense over non-Christians in their dealings within society. A comparison of Melanchthon with Luther reveals that Melanchthon did not reduce the natural law and the Decalogue to an agape-motivated ethics based on the dual commandment of love as Luther did." For " Melanchthon, A Melntlclitllo~~ Render, 29 For example, see B.A. Gernsh, Grace and Reason. A Study in tlv 77lealogy of Lutller (Oxford: Clarendon I'ress, 1962), 34.